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THE JURY TRIAL REINVENTED
by: Christopher Robertson & Michael Shammas*
ABSTRACT
The Framers of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States
Constitution recognized that jury trials were essential for maintaining democratic legitimacy and avoiding epistemic crises. As an institution, the jury trial
is purpose-built to engage citizens in the process of deliberative, participatory
democracy with ground rules. The jury trial provides a carefully constructed
setting aimed at sorting truth from falsehood.
Despite its value, the jury trial has been under assault for decades. Concededly, jury trials can sometimes be inefficient, unreliable, unpredictable, and
impractical. The COVID–19 pandemic rendered most physical jury trials unworkable but spurred some courts to begin using technology to transcend
time-and-place limitations. These reforms inspire more profound changes.
Rather than abolishing or cabining the jury trial, it should be reinvented
with the benefit of modern science and technology. Features to be reconsidered include having local juries even for national civil cases, using unrepresentative groups of only six to twelve jurors, allowing attorneys to arbitrarily
exclude jurors during voir dire, having synchronous and chronological
presentations of cases over days or weeks, asking jurors to ignore inadmissible
evidence and arguments that arise during live trials, and relying on secretive
deliberations infected by implicit bias.
Several of these extant practices work to disenfranchise or disempower
Americans along racial, gender, and economic lines, thereby undermining one
of the jury’s core functions. Other features cause jurors to err in resolving
cases accurately, which can sometimes mean the difference between life and
death. A reinvented, modernized jury institution can better serve its purposes
by increasing citizen engagement, better fostering civic education and democratic deliberation, improving accuracy in sorting truth from falsehood, and
enhancing efficiency in terms of both time and cost.
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INTRODUCTION

The COVID–19 pandemic has shaken American institutions, including key hallmarks of the judiciary like the jury trial. This institutional stress has occurred at a time when Americans are suffering
from epistemic and democratic crises. The epistemic crisis reflects a
modern difficulty in sorting fact from falsehood.1 A proliferation of
conspiracy theories—involving everything from vaccine efficacy to
“QAnon” to the 2020 presidential election—reflects the anxiety-provoking uncertainty that many Americans feel. At the same time, the
democratic crisis reflects a country riven by a toxic yet understandable
populism, marked by distrust of elites and “their” institutions.2
Targets of suspicion include Congress, administrative agencies (a.k.a.
“the swamp,” or “the deep state”), and state and federal courts, which
were painted as corrupt or even malevolent during the 2020 presidential election.3
A reinvented American jury presents a partial solution to these epistemic and democratic crises, and the jolt of the coronavirus has loosened resistance to change. The necessity of reforming jury trials, and
the opportunity to do so, has rarely been clearer.
1. See YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAMANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 4 (2018).
2. See Michael J. Klarman, Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (2020) (“[A]uthoritarian populists
often attack the ruling elite as corrupt and promise to restore power to the people.”).
3. See, e.g., Christopher D. Kromphardt & Michael F. Salamone, “Unpresidented!” or: What Happens When the President Attacks the Federal Judiciary on
Twitter, 18 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 84, 84, 89 (2021); Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-robertsrebuke.html [https://perma.cc/Y9DJ-N2EJ]; Darren Samuelsohn & Josh Gerstein,
Federal Judge Rebukes Trump over Roger Stone Jury Comments, POLITICO (Feb. 25,
2020, 3:18 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/25/judge-rebukes-trumproger-stone-jury-117442 [https://perma.cc/KX6C-6MLP].
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Consider the structure of government absent a well-functioning jury
institution. In distributing power horizontally (across the federal government’s three branches) and vertically (via powers reserved to the
states), the Framers built many buttresses against populist rule.4 The
Electoral College, for example, was largely designed “to ensure that
elites directly picked the President.”5 And even the less aristocratic,
more democratic Framers—for example, those behind the Seventh
Amendment—failed to sufficiently anticipate the rise of political parties, which would eventually span all branches of government, consolidating power and undermining the common good.6 Because the
existence of factions gives politicians strong incentives to fall in line,
Congress can rarely be counted on to use powers like impeachment to
check the President.7 Extreme partisanship has even given us reason
to question the willingness of congressional partisans to reliably count
Electoral College votes.8
Nonetheless, the Constitution’s Framers—or at least those who rallied for a Bill of Rights—enshrined the right to trial by jury within the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments.9 The amendments protected both a
civic process for deliberative democracy unmediated by elites, and a
means for reliably sorting truth from falsehood.10 As William Blackstone noted in 1783, the jury “preserves in the hands of the people
that share which they ought to have in the administration of public
justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and
wealthy citizens.”11 With a robust jury, Americans need not rely on a
corrupted political system to represent their interests; a (largely) ran4. Klarman, supra note 2, at 135 (“The Constitution’s Framers wrestled with a
perennial problem of representative government: how to prevent democratic majorities from redistributing property in their favor.”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006)
(“[T]he separation of powers would harness political competition into a system of
government that would effectively organize, check, balance, and diffuse power.”).
5. Klarman, supra note 2, at 67.
6. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 4, at 2320.
7. David Crary, Impeachment a Rarely Used Path for Upending a President, AP
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/richard-nixon-donald-trump-ap-topnews-bills-politics-cd45ec8474fb4df080f5d98c1ecfba79 [https://perma.cc/S96S-X8Rl].
8. See Jake Tapper, At Least 140 House Republicans to Vote Against Counting
Electoral Votes, Two GOP Lawmakers Say, CNN (Dec. 31, 2020, 5:51 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/12/31/politics/electoral-college-house-republicans/index.html
[https://perma.cc/9BTK-28FL].
9. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2014) (“Jury trials, of course, predated the United States
Constitution, but their almost universal acceptance in the colonies and then the newly
formed states made them a central point of agreement in establishing the constitutional principles of government. Juries served as a reminder that citizens were the
ultimate decision-makers in a democratic society.” (internal citations omitted)).
10. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND
JURIES (2016).
11. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379–80.
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dom sample of everyday people does so directly and temporarily,
averting problems of corruption and incumbency.12 And in the rarefied setting of a jury trial (unlike, say, social-media), citizens are empowered to deliberate at their best. Thanks to the Rules of Evidence,
they are shielded (albeit imperfectly) from “irrelevant, unreliable, and
prejudicial information.”13 It is not difficult to see why the procedure
by which juries make decisions may increase not only their legitimacy
and authoritativeness but also that of the entire government, just as
the Framers intended.14
Despite—or perhaps because of—its potential to foster democratic
deliberation and increase epistemic legitimacy, the jury trial has been
under assault for decades.15 Juries now resolve fewer than one in
twenty cases.16 As some call for the jury’s abolition and others work to
stymie its impact, the Sixth and especially the Seventh Amendments
face concerted, well-funded opposition.17 On the criminal side, plea
12. See Michael Elias Shammas, Commentary, Analysis: Do You Get a Jury Trial
in Federal Condemnation Cases?, CIV. JURY PROJECT NYU SCH. L., https://
civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/analysis-do-you-get-a-jury-trial-in-federal-condemnationcases/ [https://perma.cc/Z6W9-ELYA] (“[U]nlike experts (repeat players), jurors need
not worry about their reputation, which in turn allows for greater honesty and for
more disagreement among jurors. . . . [D]isagreement heightens the likelihood that a
group will come to an accurate conclusion . . . .”); Michael H. O’Donnell, Judge Extols
Wisdom of Juries, IDAHO ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.idahostatejournal.com/
news/local/judge-extols-wisdom-of-juries/article_8dad172c-25.21-11e4-8891001a4bcf887a.html [https://perma.cc/T3AY-PAX7]; compare LAWRENCE LESSIG,
THEY DON’T REPRESENT US: RECLAIMING OUR DEMOCRACY xiii (2019) (describing
institutional corruption in politics), with Christopher T. Robertson, Blinding as a Solution to Institutional Corruption 18 (Harvard Univ. Edmond J. Safra Ctr. for Ethics,
Working Paper No. 21, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321353 (“The jury ‘represents’ the public from which it is drawn in a statistical sense, rather than via the political process of electoral representation.”).
13. Robertson, supra note 12, at 19; see also FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
14. See generally DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK vii, viii (2008); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW v, vi
(2006).
15. See William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 70–73, 76 (2006) (“[T]he American jury system is
dying out—more rapidly on the civil than on the criminal side . . . and more rapidly in
the federal than in the state courts—but dying nonetheless.” (quoting United States v.
Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 n.11 (D. Mass. 2002))); Martin H. Redish, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 508 (1975) (“[M]any would probably find the burdens of
the civil jury so overwhelming that they would deny the constitutional right altogether, and give Congress total discretion as to when (if at all) the civil jury should be
used.”).
16. See Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite
Gone: Trials Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, 101
JUDICATURE 26, 28 (2017) (depicting a notable decline in federal jury trials from 2000
to 2015).
17. See Letter from Harold Kim, Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Chamber Inst. Legal Reform, to Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on
Judiciary, and Doug Collins, Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives
Comm. on Judiciary (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/
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bargaining makes trial by jury a rarity invoked by only the least rational defendants—those willing to reject a much more favorable offer
from the prosecutor who holds near-total power over what crimes to
charge and what sentences to recommend.18 On the civil side, advocated “reforms” include sending even more cases to arbitration19 or
summarily adjudicating them before trial.20 Even after jury trials,
judges sometimes flip outcomes or impose damage caps that contradict the jury’s determinations.21
Much dissatisfaction with civil juries stems from executives who fear
that juries empower the public to hold business accountable.22 But, of
190910_h.r._1423_fairact_housejudiciary.pdf [https://perma.cc/22QC-5C2N] (advocating against the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act); Gene Schaerr &
Jed Brinton, Business and Jury Trials: The Framers’ Vision Versus Modern Reality, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1056 (2010) (arguing that “at least [90%]” of the general counsel
of Fortune 500 companies “would [if possible] vote to abolish the right to jury trial”);
Judson Phillips, Trump Tort Reform Threatens the 7th Amendment, WASH. TIMES
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/2/trump-tort-reform-threatens-7th-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/92HR-QTNQ] (arguing that the
tort-reform movement threatens jury trials).
18. See Megan S. Wright, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Christopher T. Robertson, Inside the Black Box of Prosecutor Discretion, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2022); Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural
Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice
and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1516–17 (2016).
19. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345–46 (2011) (describing the Federal Arbitration Act and noting the “national policy” in favor of arbitration agreements (citation omitted)). But see Sevier Cnty. Schs. Fed. Credit Union v.
Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 990 F.3d 470, 481 (6th Cir. 2021) (finding an arbitration
agreement invalid on narrow grounds); Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of
Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 17
(2003) (discussing how most “lawyers, courts, and commentators have failed to adequately consider constitutional rights to a jury trial in determining the validity of arbitration clauses”).
20. See Suja A. Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury?: Proposals for
Revamping Plea Bargaining and Summary Judgment, 43 LITIG. 25, 29–30 (2017); see
also Sarah Sachs, The Jury Is out: Mandating Pre-Treatment Arbitration Clauses in
Patient Intake Contracts, 2018 J. DISP. RESOL. 117, 117 (2018) (noting how most patients do not understand that they are signing away “their right to a jury trial or judicial oversight of their disputes” after signing patient intake forms).
21. E.g., Saccameno v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 943 F.3d 1071, 1088, 1091 (7th Cir.
2019) (reducing punitive damages to approximately one-fifth what the jury awarded);
see also George L. Priest, Introduction to CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 4 (2002).
22. Young, supra note 15, at 76. Said Young:
[I]t is fair to observe that for decades, business and insurance interests have
disparaged our civil juries while the courts have failed to defend the single
institution upon which their moral authority ultimately depends. As a result, . . . bipartisan majorities . . . have restricted access to the . . . jury
severely.
Id.; see also NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT
341 (2007) (finding that juries hold corporate actors liable “because of their greater
knowledge, resources, and potential for impact”).
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course, that is a key reason for their existence.23 Since the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention were, “for the most part, creditor-oriented nationalists,” they may have intentionally omitted a civil jury
right, which is populist and potentially favors debtors.24 “The omission
of the civil jury triggered a firestorm of protest.”25 To ensure that the
judiciary served the economic interests of the many, anti-federalists
insisted on the inclusion of the Seventh Amendment and related provisions in the Judiciary Act of 1789.26 The criminal jury right has a
similarly populist bent.27
Of course, some oppose jury trials for good-faith reasons. Given the
small number of jurors on any panel, their decisions can be fairly criticized as being almost as unpredictable as a lottery.28 As currently constituted, juries are demographically unrepresentative—largely due to
ethnic, racial, and class-based disparities—frustrating the ideal of
judgment by one’s peers.29 Relatedly, most Americans view compulsory jury service as a huge imposition, especially when it conflicts with
personal and professional obligations.30 Even within the legal profession, overworked lawyers and judges often prefer quick and certain
pleas or settlements to lengthy and uncertain jury trials.31 The
23. Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L L. 79, 84 (2003) (“It is generally assumed, and not without reason,
that juries are prone to favor civil litigants who are members of the community whom
they represent.”).
24. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 597 (1993) (internal citation omitted).
25. Id. at 598.
26. See generally Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 96–114 (1923).
27. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge.”).
28. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1125 (1992) (collecting critiques of
juries); see also Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 375 (2011) (“The jury is said to be the least predictable of the
decision makers in the legal system.”).
29. See HIROSHI FUKURAI, EDGAR W. BUTLER & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE AND
THE JURY 3–4 (James Alan Fox & Joseph Weis eds., 1993); Rob Walters, Michael
Marin & Mark Curriden, Are We Getting a Jury of Our Peers?, 68 TEX. BAR J. 144,
145–46 (2005).
30. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332–33 (1916) (noting that the Thirteenth
Amendment does not bar “enforcement of those duties [that] individuals owe to the
state, such as services in the army, militia, [or] the jury”); Andrew J. Bloeser, Carl
McCurley & Jeffery J. Mondak, Jury Service as Civic Engagement: Determinants of
Jury Summons Compliance, 40 AM. POL. RSCH. 179, 184–85 (2012); Thomas L.
Fowler, Filling the Box: Responding to Jury Duty Avoidance, 23 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 1
nn. 4–5 (1997).
31. Christopher Slobogin, The Case for a Federal Criminal Court System (and Sentencing Reform), 108 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 942 (2020) (noting that “the number of
criminal and prisoner cases commenced in federal court has far outpaced increases in
judgeships”); Darryl K. Brown, Essay, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal
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coronavirus pandemic only heightened concerns about jury trials,
which entail convening six to twelve jurors in an enclosed space before
having them deliberate for hours, days, or even longer.32
Indeed, juries can be inefficient and unpredictable. Rather than
abolishing or cabining them, however, we should reinvent them so
that they better serve their original purposes of fostering democratic
engagement and epistemic legitimacy.
Compare the carriages, bridges, and ships used for war and transport in 1789 with technologies used for such purposes today. The
changes are profound. Scientific and technological advances revolutionized warfare and transportation; in doing so, they made both endeavors more convenient, more efficient, and more effective. Yet
aside from admitting a broader franchise of citizens, today’s juries
scarcely differ from their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century counterparts.33 Given this stagnancy, it is unsurprising that the jury trial is
not optimally adapted to modernity. The warships that Thomas Jefferson ordered to bombard the Barbary Pirates would not be able to
fulfill their purpose accurately or efficiently today, either.
Scientific advances, combined with the ever-increasing ease of longdistance communication, make one wonder what the jury would resemble if it had been invented in 2021. Given the rise of applied statistics and findings from political psychology, behavioral economics,
neuroscience, and other fields, would we stick to twelve or fewer jurors? Would we allow lawyers to handpick some jurors to remove “peremptorily” out of sheer intuition or prejudice? Would we force jurors
to sit through live, synchronous trials lasting days, weeks, or even
months? Would we continue hoping that, when exposed to inadmissible evidence, merely instructing jurors to ignore that evidence will
cure or eliminate prejudice? Given the proliferation of inexpensive
computers and the Internet, would we even require jurors to physically assemble at courthouses? Would we conduct civil trials of national importance, involving issues like patent infringement or product
liability, with juries chosen from local venires? Would we still have
jurors deliberate in secret, often by way of personal anecdotes and
racialized and gendered rhetoric that would have been utterly inadmissible at trial? In hindsight, the jury trial of 1789 seems, at best,
quaint—and, at worst, counterproductive.
It turns out that these familiar features of the jury are not essential;
they are historical contingencies reflecting eighteenth-century scienProcess, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 183–84 (2014) (“The number of cases that courts must
resolve has grown relentlessly for decades, and the public infrastructure has not kept
pace.”); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and
Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1098 (2003).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See generally Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of
Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 377–79 (1996).
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tific and technological realities.34 Scholars have suggested moderate
reforms.35 We believe that a more fundamental reckoning is in order.
This Article proceeds in three parts. The first Part discusses the effects of the coronavirus (“COVID–19”) pandemic on the judiciary
throughout 2020 and 2021. We show that many of our proposed reforms are no longer speculative but were wholly or partly implemented in real cases. We also discuss coronavirus-era caselaw with
implications for the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of online trials.
The second Part articulates six fundamental reforms aimed at bringing
juries into the twenty-first century. These include: (1) increasing the
number of randomly selected jurors and eliminating peremptory challenges; (2) increasing the use of video presentations; (3) shortening
and reorganizing trial presentations; (4) divorcing trials from classic
time and place restrictions; (5) creating nationwide jury pools for national cases (and expanding criminal pools to the extent that the Constitution permits); and (6) aggregating votes that individual jurors cast,
thereby discarding interpersonal “deliberation” entirely. The third
and final Part briefly reviews whether courts are likely to hold these
reforms constitutional before gesturing toward several necessary
changes to the rules of civil and criminal procedure.
II. ONLINE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

IN

2020 & 2021

The COVID–19 pandemic has left no institution untouched. Thus
far, the institutions that survived—and that may even thrive when the
crisis ends—are those that have adapted.
In this Part, we review the judiciary’s response to the pandemic
while also detailing attempts by state and local governments and academic institutions to brainstorm “best practices” for online trials. We
also detail constitutional concerns in the criminal context to argue
that—when pandemics like COVID–19 surpass one year—online trials may be constitutionally necessary if defendants’ speedy-trial rights
are to be respected.

34. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970) (“[T]he fact that the
jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a historical accident, unnecessary
to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance . . . .” (citing
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 182 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); see also Ian
Ayres, Pregnant with Embarrassments: An Incomplete Theory of the Seventh Amendment, 26 VAL. L. REV. 385, 387–89 (1991) (arguing that a significant typo—a conspicuous comma—in the Seventh Amendment indicates that the Framers’ text is fallible).
35. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1178, 1184 (1995) (suggesting that when called for jury
duty, courts should not excuse people claiming to be burdened by service and arguing
that “more trials can take place if we get rid of all the wasteful preliminaries like
elaborate voir dire”).
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A. COVID–19’s Effect on Civil Trials
The first federal plan for safeguarding a functioning judiciary in the
event of a pandemic was published in April 2007 when the Department of Justice released a report entitled Guidelines for Pandemic
Emergency Preparedness Planning: A Road Map for Courts
(“Roadmap”).36 The Roadmap, which is far more useful logistically
than legally, provided federally supported guidelines to state and local
courts detailing step-by-step, so-called “best practices” for pandemicresponse plans.37 The document presciently acknowledged that, in the
case of a prolonged pandemic, adopting a greater embrace of the Internet will be not only useful but “needed to continue operations.”38
Despite mentioning the necessity of increasing courts’ teleconferencing abilities and writing that courts should “review alternative court
sites and other means by which to communicate with . . . participants,”
the authors did not conduct an in-depth analysis on the concept of
online jury or bench trials.39
When the pandemic struck in 2020, courts, schools, and employers
adapted first, moving lessons online and asking (or demanding) that
non-essential employees work from home. Federal and state legislatures were close behind. On May 15, 2020, only two months after journalists wondered whether a “virtual Congress is possible,”40 Congress
answered in the affirmative.41 This was no small change. Per the New
York Times, “the coronavirus pandemic officially succeeded” where
the 1793 Philadelphia yellow fever and 1918 Spanish influenza outbreaks, September 11, 2001, attacks, and “generations of agitators for
36. See CRIM. CTS. TECH. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, GUIDELINES FOR PANDEMIC
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PLANNING: A ROAD MAP FOR COURTS, BUREAU JUST.
ASSISTANCE 1 (Apr. 2007), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/Pandemic_Road_Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/HH3Q-NJDC] (“[I]t is vital to develop a structured plan for preparing the courts to cope with a pandemic outbreak.”).
37. Id. at 14–15 (“[E]xisting legal authority relating to public health matters
should be analyzed to ensure there is adequate legal foundation for any court actions.
The planning process should include the following key components: [(1)] [f]ormation
of a planning committee[,] . . . [(2)] [r]eview of constitutional provisions and pertinent
authority under state law and [appropriate] regulations[,] . . . [and (3)] [c]onsideration
of technological and other capabilities . . . .” (emphasis added)).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. See id. at 11. Although not comprehensive, the Roadmap did discuss ways to
preserve public access to courts. Id. (“Employing technology such as televised court
proceedings, public access to computerized information systems, and simultaneous
court transcription to provide participants and the public access to court proceedings
may help remedy this issue.”).
40. Evan Halper & Jennifer Haberkorn, Congress May Move Online as Members
Become Sick, Quarantined, GOVERNING (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.governing.com/
now/Congress-May-Move-Online-as-Members-Become-Sick-Quarantined.html
[https://perma.cc/G2R3-6X9R].
41. Nicholas Fandos, With Move to Remote Voting, House Alters What It Means
for Congress to Meet, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/
15/us/politics/remote-voting-house-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/CVQ9-AV4P].
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institutional change” failed—it untethered “Congress from its mandate to come together physically.”42
If legislators can move online, why not judges? And if legislators
can make law online, and judges can interpret law online, why should
jurors be incapable of applying law online?
With its reliance on arguments from authority and its reverence for
precedent, the judiciary can sometimes seem particularly traditionalist.43 This may partly explain why some state judiciaries took surprisingly long to meaningfully respond to the pandemic.44 For example,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas did not suspend or otherwise substantially alter jury trials until November 20, 2020.45 This delay occurred
even though the Governor had announced a state of emergency on
March 11, 2020,46 only two days before President Trump declared a
national emergency.47
Still, many courts were more aggressive in trying to move as much
business as possible from the courthouse to the Internet. Although
some courthouses successfully configured their courtrooms to comply
with the CDC’s social-distancing guidelines, many courts found that
their facilities simply could not be physically reconfigured in a manner
enabling safe jury trials.48 Even if it were possible to physically reconfigure every courthouse, doing so might be cost prohibitive.49 Even
courts that were initially reluctant to do so therefore found themselves
moving several functions online.

42. Id.
43. E.g., Brad Taylor, Law in the Time of Covid-19: Looking Backward While
Moving Forward, 108 ILL. BAR J. 26, 26 (2020) (“The legal profession is, out of necessity, practicality, or sometimes sheer stubbornness, notoriously backward looking.”);
see also JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS 215
(2013) (“In short, the legal profession is ponderous, backward looking, and selfpreservationist.”).
44. See generally COVID-19 Roundup: Court Closures and Procedural Changes,
Westlaw (Apr. 30, 2020), 2020 WL 1223450 (detailing information updated as of April
2020 about court closures and procedural changes, including several instances in
which courts extended court shut-downs long after first anticipated).
45. In re Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 WL 6817802, at *1–3 (Ark.
Nov. 20, 2020).
46. Id. at *1.
47. Andrew S. Boutros, Jay R. Schleppenbach & Gregory T. Noorigian, The Collision of the Speedy Trial Clock with the Coronavirus’s Slowdown Realities: Justice in
the Time of COVID-19, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Oct. 26, 2020, at 49.
48. Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., Pandemic Potpourri: The Legal Profession’s Rediscovery of Teleconferencing, 59 JUDGES’ J. 37, 38 (2020).
49. Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 49, 53 (writing that despite an August 2020
felony trial in the Northern District of Illinois, “it remains to be seen whether the
intense precautions taken there, which applied to every aspect of the juror’s experience from parking to security to deliberations, can be replicated on a widespread
basis”).
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The first such judicial proceedings were generally pre-trial hearings
and depositions.50 On March 31, 2020, the Judicial Conference temporarily “approved . . . video and teleconferencing for certain criminal
and civil proceedings.”51 Importantly, “[t]his approval also” authorized judges to use “teleconferencing to provide the public and media
audio access to court proceedings.”52 The Judicial Conference’s action
followed the March 27, 2020, passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, which temporarily expanded
video- and telephone conferencing for certain judicial proceedings.53
The CARES Act’s passage prompted states to increase the use of
videoconferencing in court proceedings.54 Not coincidently, then,
March 2020 marked a turning point after which courts increasingly
pondered the logistics of holding trials and hearings online for the remainder of the pandemic.
Although courts were hesitant to conduct actual trials online, the
idea was not altogether new, having been discussed in law review articles in 2006 and, briefly, in 1994.55 That said, most pre-coronavirus
scholarship focused on hearings, depositions, and other functions that
involve judges and attorneys but not jurors.
In June 2020, NYU Law’s Civil Jury Project enlisted dozens of
judges, academics, and practitioners to craft protocols intended for
online civil jury trials; it then tested the protocols in a mock trial.56
The three protocols detailed best practices for online (1) jury selection, (2) trial, and (3) deliberation.57 The participants generally concluded that, while challenging, online civil jury trials are viable if
reasonable precautions are undertaken.58 The mock trial remains
50. See, e.g., Sonrai Sys., LLC v. Romano, No. 16 CV 3371, 2020 WL 3960441, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2020) (COVID–19 “health concerns . . . create[d] ‘good cause’
for the entry of an order requiring that Geotab’s experts’ depositions take place by
remote videoconference.”); SAPS, LLC v. EZCare Clinic, Inc., No. 19-11229, 2020
WL 1923146, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2020) (“This court will not require parties to
appear in person . . . in the midst of the present pandemic.”).
51. Dixon, supra note 48, at 38.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Nancy S. Marder, Cyberjuries: A New Role as Online Mock Juries, 38 U. TOL.
L. REV. 239, 239 (2006) (“[O]nline juries . . . could offer online group decision-making
by laypersons in cases that do not require a traditional jury trial.”); Henry H. Perritt
Jr., Changing Litigation with Science and Technology: Video Depositions, Transcripts
and Trials, 43 EMORY L.J. 1071, 1071–72 (1994) (suggesting the concept); see also
Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson & David Yokum, Crowdsourcing & Data Analytics: The New Settlement Tools, 102 JUDICATURE 62, 63 (2018) (arguing for online
mock juries as an alternative to trials).
56. See Virtual Jury Trial Protocols, CIV. JURY PROJECT (2021), https://
civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/resources-2/protocols/ [https://perma.cc/X4QS-SSNP].
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Michael Shammas, The Verdict Is in: Online Jury Trials Are Possible,
CIV. JURY PROJECT, https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/the-verdict-is-in-online-jurytrials-are-possible/ [https://perma.cc/JN88-GKQF] (proposing “mixed” trials during
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available on YouTube,59 and major libraries have developed repositories of relevant materials.60
Several jurisdictions began proposing their own protocols. The Yolo
County Superior Court of California promulgated exemplary guidelines for jurors and attorneys aimed at minimizing the risk of spreading infectious diseases.61 The county effectively determined that only
proceedings (e.g., jury deliberations in their view) that cannot be constitutionally, practically, or confidentially completed via videoconferencing should be conducted inside courthouses with social-distancing
safeguards like spaced seating.62 Other jurisdictions soon followed,
with some—like Illinois—citing the Civil Jury Project’s protocols.63
An Alabama district court set a trial date of June 1, 2020, in what
“was set to be the first federal civil [jury] trial in the country after
courts closed for the coronavirus pandemic.”64 The court eventually
concluded on its own motion that a continuance to limit the virus’s
spread was warranted while nonetheless emphasizing that “[j]ury trials cannot remain stalled indefinitely.”65 In an order staying trials,
likewise, California’s Chief Justice noted that “[c]ourts may conduct
such a trial at an [another] date, upon a finding of good cause shown
or through the use of remote technology.”66
The first COVID–19 online trial was a bench trial (without a jury)
held on April 22, 2020, when a Harris County, Texas judge oversaw a
one-day trial over the Zoom videoconferencing platform.67 Despite its
the pandemic to preserve confidentiality with some portions held online and other
portions—such as confidential jury deliberations—held in socially spaced courtrooms) [hereinafter Online Jury Trials Are Possible].
59. Civ. Jury Project, Highlights from the Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law
and CCCPC Virtual Mock Trial, YOUTUBE (July 21, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7U_aVbklGpU&feature=YOutu.be. [https://perma.cc/ZQF3-22DJ].
60. See, e.g., Robin Gardner, Annotated Bibliography of Covid-19 Legal Literature, U. MELB. L. SCH. LIBR. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0008/3522437/MLS-COVID-19-Legal-Scholarship-Bibliography-Consolidation-26Oct2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWL2-D5X6] (providing Australian, Canadian,
British, and American scholarship on reconciling common law procedures with
COVID–19).
61. See Online Jury Trials Are Possible, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. Court Operations During COVID-19 Task Force: Guidelines on Remote Jury
Selection in Civil Trials, ILL. CTS. 2, https://courts.illinois.gov/CircuitCourt/Jury/Remote/Remote_Jury_Selection_Guidelines.pdfv [https://perma.cc/Y7ZA-FU7J].
64. See Quinn v. City of Tuskegee, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1263 (M.D. Ala. 2020).
65. Id.
66. Judicial Council of California Statewide Emergency Order by Hon. Tani G.
Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice of California and Chair of the Judicial Council,
LACOURT.ORG (Mar. 30, 2020), http://www.lacourt.org/newsmedia/uploads/14202043
1048StatewideOrderbytheChiefJustice-ChairoftheJudicialCouncil03-30-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4D8P-S5J9].
67. Daniel Siegal, Texas Court Pioneers Trial by Zoom in Atty Fee Dispute,
LAW360 (Apr. 22, 2020, 10:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1265459/texascourt-pioneers-trial-by-zoom-in-atty-fee-dispute [https://perma.cc/8SNX-BRZX].
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relatively boring subject matter (attorneys’ fees), the case garnered
substantial interest.68 Approximately 2,000 viewers tuned in.69
The nation’s first pandemic-era online civil jury trial was held in
Texas state court on May 18, 2020.70 Although the verdict was nonbinding,71 the trial was nonetheless notable because of how relatively
smoothly it went, thereby proving the concept. Texas blazed another
path when, in August 2020, a “virtual jury trial . . . brought about by
the pandemic” was conducted by a state criminal court in Travis
County, Texas.72 Watched by approximately 1,000 viewers, the case
involved “misdemeanor charges alleging excessive speed in a construction zone,” and—after using a “private virtual room to review the
evidence and deliberate”—the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the
speeding charge and not-guilty on the work-zone enhancement
charge.73 A third online jury trial soon followed, this time in a federal
civil court in Seattle, Washington, yielding a $1.35 million verdict.74
Griffin v. Albanese Enterprise, Inc. has been called “the nation’s
first . . . fully remote, state court civil jury trial” with a binding verdict.75 Florida jurors awarded the plaintiff more than $300,000 in damages for a beating suffered at the hands of bouncers in a Jacksonville,
Florida, club.76 The court conducted jury selection entirely online, and
the one-day trial remains digitally available for study by scholars, lawyers, and judges.77
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Nate Raymond, Texas Tries a Pandemic First: A Jury Trial by Zoom,
REUTERS (May 18, 2020, 6:19 AM), https://reut.rs/3hKVqCs [https://perma.cc/J3H66496]. The verdict was non-binding. Id.
71. Id. (“[T]he abbreviated format and non-binding verdict make it ideal to test
the viability of holding jury trials remotely, as they grapple with the more daunting
challenge of how to conduct them safely in person during the pandemic.”).
72. Dixon, supra note 48, at 38.
73. See id. “Prosecutors and defense attorneys posted exhibits using the file-sharing service Box. The defendant’s counsel used a virtual breakout room to confer with
their client.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
74. Id.
75. Arlin Crisco, $354K+ Verdict Wraps Landmark Remote Jury Trial Over Woman’s Beating at Florida Club, COURTROOM VIEW NETWORK (Aug. 11, 2020, 2:25
PM), https://blog.cvn.com/354k-verdict-wraps-landmark-remote-jury-trial-overwomans-beating-at-florida-club [https://perma.cc/M6H9-67UA] (emphasis added); see
also Kevin-Khristián Cosgriff Hernández, Key Takeaways from Groundbreaking Virtual Civil Jury Trial, LAW360 (Oct. 8, 2020, 12:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/
articles/1317417?utm_source=RSs&utm_medium=RSs&utm_campaign=Section
[https://perma.cc/K888-AU5F].
76. See sources cited supra note 75.
77. Cayla Griffin vs. Albanese Enterprise, Inc., COURTROOM VIEW NETWORK,
https://pages.cvn.com/duval-county-florida-remote-trial-program [https://perma.cc/
ERD9-VMEL]; see also Justin Jouvenal, Justice by Zoom: Frozen Video, a Cat — and
Finally a Verdict, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/jus
tice-by-zoom-frozen-video-a-cat—and-finally-a-verdict/2020/08/12/3e073c56-dbd311ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html (Aug. 12, 2020, 5:19 PM) [https://perma.cc/V9R52DDZ].
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B. Criminal Trials & the Speedy-Trial Guarantee
The criminal justice system saw particularly disruptive challenges
due to COVID–19. Jurisdictions altered their usual criminal practice
in several ways, including, namely: tolling statutes of limitations,78 releasing inmates early through parole or compassionate-release programs,79 and limiting visitation to prisons and jails.80 State and federal
appellate courts also began hearing criminal and civil oral arguments
via audio or video.81
In trial courts, the coronavirus’s impact has varied according to the
severity of crimes charged and the stage of proceedings. “At one extreme, a wide range of constitutional rights are implicated at a criminal trial; and for that reason, no online felony trial has been
conducted. At the other, at least one misdemeanor trial and several
pre-trial proceedings, as well as appellate and post-conviction proceedings, have been conducted online.”82 The Internet worked especially well for “proceedings like first appearances and plea colloquies,
which consist of the bulk of caseloads.”83
Juries were of particular concern. Courts moved quickly to allow
grand juries to deliberate online especially after the Southern District
of New York, citing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, did so.84
More controversially, a federal judge permitted a juror, during the live
courtroom trial of an Iranian banker, to deliberate “by FaceTime because the juror reported feeling unwell. In light of coronavirus concerns, [the judge] stated the court was under ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ and in ‘untested waters.’ After being assured the juror
78. See, e.g., COVID-19 and the Criminal Justice System: A Guide for State
Lawmakers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/covid-19-and-the-criminal-justice-system-a-guide-forstate-lawmakers.aspx [https://perma.cc/5758-K9TD] (“Ohio’s legislature enacted a
law tolling statutes of limitations for criminal offenses, civil actions and administrative
actions . . . set to expire between March 9, 2020[,] and July 30, 2020.”).
79. See id.
80. Id. (“At least [seventeen] states and Washington, D.C., suspended all visitation[,] and the remaining [thirty-three] states suspended normal visitation while allowing visits with attorneys.”).
81. Id. “In the beginning of the pandemic, the U.S. Supreme Court postponed oral
arguments and held oral arguments by telephone, making live audio of the arguments
available to the public for the first time ever.” Id. In addition, Kansas allowed “the
use of two-way electronic audio-visual communication in court proceedings.” Id.
82. Deniz Ariturk, William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Virtual Criminal
Courts, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 15, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/
2020/11/16/covid-ariturk/ [https://perma.cc/GF6E-EX2C].
83. Id.
84. See Pete Brush, Grand Jurors in SDNY Get Video Option Amid Virus Outbreak, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1255774/
grand-jurors-in-sdny-get-video-option-amid-virus-outbreak [https://perma.cc/CUV3BBHR]; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (not requiring physical presence).
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would be secluded in [an] apartment, [the judge] stated to the juror,
‘You must think of yourself as present in the jury room.’”85
For criminal trials, the pandemic created a double bind. On one
hand, the speedy-trial guarantee presses courts to use video if necessary to clear cases, but the Confrontation Clause arguably suggests
that only physical trials can pass constitutional muster.86 In 2020, defense attorneys began questioning “how much delay is too much for
the speedy-trial right, even when dealing with a global pandemic.”87
Concerned about speedy-trial rights, some emphasized “the need for
solutions like video[ ]conferencing to avoid delay, if doing so is in
their clients’ interests.”88 Unfortunately, the March 2020 CARES Act
merely signaled that videoconferencing is permitted; it did not say
when it is allowed; nor did it “provide instructions, much less guidance, on defendants’ speedy-trial rights.”89
Since the “Constitution does not specifically define what it means
for a trial to be ‘speedy,’” speedy-trial timelines were initially determined state by state.90 But in 1974, Congress passed the Speedy Trial
Act91 to promote jurisdictional uniformity. “Interestingly, the Act’s
proponents did not focus solely on the rights of individual defendants,
but also on a perceived need to obtain convictions quickly to reduce
the risks of recidivism.”92 As a result, although the Sixth Amendment’s speedy-trial provisions relate to defendant-oriented due process concerns, the statutory framework has a broader focus.
That framework establishes concrete time limits to complete federal
criminal prosecutions. For instance, absent court-approved extensions,
the period between arrest and indictment usually cannot exceed thirty
days while that between arraignment and trial cannot surpass seventy.93 If these limits are violated, then absent a recognized exclusion,
“the complaint may be dismissed with or without prejudice depending
85. Richard Gabriel, What Online Jury Trials Could Look Like, LAW360 (Mar. 26,
2020, 2:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1257185/what-online-jury-trialscould-look-like [https://perma.cc/BKN5-TDVZ].
86. See, e.g., Brandon Marc Draper, Essay, And Justice for None: How COVID-19
Is Crippling the Criminal Jury Right, 62 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT I.-1, I.-3 (2020)
(arguing that jury trial by video conference would be “inherently unconstitutional” in
nature but acknowledging that it could be necessary to use such trials, at least when
defendants consent, because of speedy-trial concerns).
87. Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 48; accord John Eric Rapp & Ben Bigham,
COVID-19 v. Criminal Defendants, 89 J. KAN. BAR ASS’N 32, 32–33 (2020).
88. Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 54.
89. Id. at 51.
90. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5 / 103-5 (West 2014).
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008).
92. Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 50 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, at 8, 11
(1974)).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)–(c).
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upon the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances that
led to the dismissal, and the impact of re-prosecution.”94
Federal courts have generally handled delays by invoking the
“[j]udicial emergency and implementation” provision of an obscure
1975 statute.95 Under the statute, the chief judge of any judicial district may request from the judicial council of her circuit up to a oneyear suspension of the Speedy Trial Act on grounds that the court is
“unable to comply . . . due to the status of its court calendars.”96 What
constitutes a “judicial emergency”97 has never been clearly defined.
The Ninth Circuit nonetheless relied on the statute to approve the
COVID–19-related continuances imposed by three-fourths of California’s federal districts.
Courts frequently invoke the “ends of justice” as a basis for excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act.98 When conducting the
§ 3161(h)(7)(A) analysis, a court must explicitly provide its justifications before granting a continuance.99 A continuance is never granted
merely “because of general congestion of the court’s calendar, lack of
diligent preparation,” or the government’s “failure to obtain available
witnesses.”100
Although courts have thus far treated coronavirus-era “litigation
continuances—even in criminal cases—as presumptively valid,” the
same may not “hold true three, six, nine, [twelve], [eighteen], or
[twenty-four] months from now.”101 Colorado’s Supreme Court has
“already recognized that blanket continuances without individualized
fact-finding offend speedy-trial rules.”102 Ultimately, “it remains to be
seen just how much delay can be tolerated under the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act.”103 Absent widespread online trials,
courts may be forced to triage cases in a manner wherein “only the
most serious felony cases involving dangerous defendants who are detained pretrial and refuse to waive speedy trial deadlines [are]
tried.”104
Defendants have also raised unsuccessful Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process objections to pandemic-era trials.105 Research showed that “three out of four jurors” were “nervous about
94. See Boutros et al., supra note 49, at 50; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1)–(2).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3174(a).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
99. Id.; see also id. § 3161(h)(7)(B) (listing statutory factors).
100. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(C).
101. Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 54–55.
102. Id. at 53–54.
103. Id. at 54.
104. See Melanie Wilson, The Pandemic Juror, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
65, 96 (2020).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Dermen, 452 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1264 (D. Utah 2020)
(finding that the defendant failed to establish the “manifest necessity” required by the
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attending a trial,” and the heterogeneity of such concerns may skew
jury pools because “people of color, Democrats, and older Americans
[were] very concerned about contracting the virus.”106
Some have also suggested that especially long delays during
pandemics could violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments—like when a defendant’s jail has an
especially high virus transmission rate.107
Defendants also objected to modified trial procedures, largely unsuccessfully. For example, when one court imposed masking and social
distancing requirements during jury selection, an intermediate Pennsylvania appellate court concluded that “the trial court did not abuse
its discretion” or violate “the essential demands of fairness.”108
Adopting a largely functionalist approach, the appeals court noted
that “the trial court indicated . . . that it was able to adequately assess
the prospective jurors’ answers during voir dire so as to determine . . .
whether to disqualify a prospective juror.”109 Notably, the same standard applies to the constitutionality of modified jury proceedings during voir dire as to other stages of the trial, such as “the guilt and
sentencing phases.”110
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a two-week, in-person jury trial in September 2020 featuring
two defendants charged with several federal substantive wire fraud
offenses.111 On the “last day of evidence presentation,” which occurred during “the morning of September 22[,] . . . a juror was hospitalized with symptoms consistent with COVID[–]19.”112 When the
defendants predictably alleged “juror coercion during deliberations
owing to the COVID[–]19 pandemic,” the district court denied their
challenges, relying, in part, on an anonymous poll conducted after the
infected juror was excused that indicated that eleven jurors wanted to
court to declare a mistrial because he failed to prove that the jury’s deliberations were
less accurate merely because they occurred during the COVID–19 pandemic).
106. Wilson, supra note 104, at 68–69.
107. See Brenda Vose, Francis T. Cullen, & Heejin Lee, Targeted Release in the
COVID-19 Correctional Crisis: Using the RNR Model to Save Lives, 45 AM. J. CRIM.
JUST. 769, 769 (2020) (providing examples of how the pandemic affected incarcerated
individuals); see also, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 847 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cole,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ failure to mitigate coronavirus-spread at the petitioners’ prison “constitutes sufficient evidence for the district court to have found that petitioners were likely to
succeed on their Eighth Amendment claim”).
108. Commonwealth v. Delmonico, 251 A.3d 829, 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 839 (noting that “the jury selection process is crucial to the preservation
of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury” because the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and due process extend
throughout the entirety of a criminal trial).
111. See United States v. Vorley, No. CR 00035, 2021 WL 1057903, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 18, 2021).
112. Id. at *2.
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“proceed with the trial” and did not feel a need to “consult . . . with a
medical professional about potential COVID-19 exposure.”113
Fluctuations in the pandemic’s severity and rate of transmission—
especially with the unexpected onset of the Delta variant in the summer of 2021—have caused some courts to reconsider their decision to
hold even socially-distanced jury trials.114 Eventually, even in the
criminal setting, courts will need to consider the possibility that jury
trials need to be modernized and brought online.
III. BRINGING JURY TRIALS

INTO THE

21ST CENTURY

One of the more encouraging lessons of COVID–19 was just how
rapidly institutions, including the judiciary, can change when pushed
to do so. But changes need not be merely reactive. Instead, they can
inspire a more profound rethinking of the jury as an institution.
In this Part, we outline six ways to reinvent jury trials. These reforms include using many more jurors to secure representativeness
rather than using peremptory challenges to undermine it; increasing
the use of video presentations to untether time and place of trial; condensing and reorganizing trial presentation; changing the time and
place of where jurors serve; creating a nationwide jury pool for national civil cases while expanding the pool in criminal cases; and aggregating juror votes individually rather than having jurors deliberate
secretly together. As we describe our proposed reforms, we take care
to mention constitutional and legal barriers, which are addressed
more directly in the next Part. If adopted, these reforms will increase
juries’ accuracy, efficiency, and democratic legitimacy, thereby furthering the jury’s institutional functions.
A. Larger Juries, Without Peremptory Challenges
Aristotle is credited with first articulating the notion of “the wisdom
of the crowd,” which stands for the proposition that many minds are
better than one mind.115 In 1785, French polymath Marquis de Condorcet published his famous Jury Theorem, which explained that, if a
hypothetical juror’s rate of accuracy on a question is at least 50%,
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Nannette Jolivette Brown, COVID-19: General Order 21-11, U.S.
DIST. CT. FOR E. DIST. LA. 1 (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.laed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/EDLA-General%20Order%2021-11%20Suspending%20Jury%20Trials.pdf [https://perma.cc/84ZJ-WMY6]; Dina Arévalo, Delta
Variant Prompts Renewed Federal Court Restrictions, MYRGVNEWS (Aug. 7, 2021),
https://myrgv.com/featured/2021/08/07/delta-variant-prompts-renewed-federal-courtrestrictions/ [https://perma.cc/5ERF-WC96] (“The current surge of COVID-19 cases
and Delta variant infections has increased the risks to public health and those involved in selecting juries and conducting jury trials,” reads the order signed by U.S.
District Judges Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Randy Crane and Micaela Alvarez.”).
115. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 223, 225 (H. Rackham trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1990);
see generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 3–22 (2005).
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then every additional juror voting on the question will increase
accuracy.116
In 1906, Sir Francis Galton—a (rather elitist) British statistician—
witnessed a contest at a country fair in Massachusetts.117 A showman
asked those attending the fair to estimate the weight of an ox for prize
money.118 The animal’s actual weight was 1,198 pounds.119 Remarkably, the median guess of 1,207 pounds was accurate within one percent
of the true value. (The average was 1,197 pounds.120) After replicating
the results, Galton was forced to conclude that collective estimates are
generally more accurate than individual ones.121 This contributed to
the insight that a group’s individual assessments can be modeled as a
probability distribution of responses with the median often appearing
near the true value of the quantity to be estimated.122
But the number of individual estimates matters greatly. Had Galton
instead randomly chosen only six to twelve of the crowd members’
guesses, the median value would have been much less likely to approximate the true value. In that case, the serendipity of chance would
have determined the outcome.
As we think about jury trials, this risk of randomness is disconcerting.123 Jury trials aim at accuracy, conceived as the uncovering of a
given case’s (specific) facts followed by the application of the community’s standards to those facts.124 In this sense, jury decisions are not
116. MARIE JEAN ANTOINE NICOLAS DE CARITAT, MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33, 48–49 (Keith Michael Baker, ed., 1976). For a useful
overview, see William P. Bottom, Krishna Ladha & Gary J. Miller, Propagation of
Individual Bias Through Group Judgment: Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically
Informative Signals, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147, 152–54 (2002).
117. See Francis Galton, Vox Populi, 75 NATURE 450, 450–51 (1907).
118. Id. at 450.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 451.
122. See Ulrik W. Nash, The Curious Anomaly of Skewed Judgment Distributions
and Systemic Error in the Wisdom of Crowds, 9 PLOS ONE 1, 4 (2014), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0112386 [https://perma.cc/
RA42-8WFE] (discussing skewed distributions).
123. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1404 (2000)
(“[S]uppose that the odds are fifty percent that a given jury will return a verdict for
the defendant and fifty percent that it will return a verdict for the class; and suppose
that if the verdict is for the class, the expected damages will be $200 million. . . . In
such a setting, a single class trial is a highly risky proposition for both sides.”).
124. See Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174,
181 (2010) (“Both the procedure and substance of the American legal system are
predicated on the assumption that, in any given case, there really is a fact of the
matter. The elaborate procedures and evidentiary rules are designed ‘to the end that
the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.’ ”) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 102)); see also Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic
purpose of a trial is the determination of truth . . . .”).
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unlike thermometers, bathroom scales, or other value-measuring
instruments.125
If everyone who saw a case would rule identically, then a jury of
twelve, six, or even one person would be quite sufficient. However,
jury verdicts are infected by two types of potential measurement errors that arise from heterogeneity in the ways that individual jurors
see cases. Some variations in a population are appropriate and need
to be represented in a jury sample if its median vote is to represent the
median perspective of the population. The effects of other variations—like an individual juror having an incorrect memory of what
happened at trial, which can be conceived as an outlier—should be
minimized. Consider how an appropriately sized jury addresses each
goal.
Scholars have noted that “as an institution deeply woven into the
fabric of popular governance, the American jury is a central site for
political representation: the political representation of citizens by citizens.”126 For that function to be accomplished, the jury’s membership
reflects the community from which it is drawn.127 Yet America is a
famously diverse society with variations across racial, cultural, religious, economic, experiential, educational, ideological, and other
dimensions. As the Supreme Court has said, the very notion of the
jury recognizes such heterogeneity; the jury is supposed to capture a
fair “cross-section of the community.”128
As an example of how this goal of representativeness can go awry,
suppose that the actual population of potential jurors in a given locality is 18% Black, and suppose further that race is important to a case
in that jurisdiction.129 By sheer (bad) luck of the draw, with only six to
125. See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 815, 847 (1992) (“Think of the jury as a measuring instrument, like a thermometer or a bathroom scale.”); Hillel J. Bavli, Sampling and Reliability in Class Action
Litigation, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 207, 210–11 (2016) (“[I]f a single claim
is tried ten times independently (each trial with a new selection of trier of fact, attorneys, etc.), it is likely that there would be ten distinct verdicts. But, if there is a single
correct outcome associated with the claim, then judgment variability reflects error—
disparities between the observed outcomes and the ‘correct’ outcome.” (emphasis in
original)).
126. Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Principles and the
Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1147 (2014) (emphasis in original). But see Fleming v. Chi. Transit Auth., 397 Fed. App’x 249, 249 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has not recognized a Constitutional mandate that jury pools in civil cases reflect
a fair cross-section of the community.”).
127. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 117, 122 (2d. ed. 2016) (discussing sampling bias).
128. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 130 (1940)).
129. See generally Portia Pedro, A Prelude to a Critical Race Theoretical Account of
Civil Procedure, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 143, 143 (2021) (“shar[ing] a personal experience with police as part of suggesting that Black people’s interactions with police
might be a source of collective identity and might help us (Black proceduralists, liti-
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twelve jurors, it would be quite possible to end up with a final panel
that is entirely white. The problem of fair representation is even worse
if one considers the importance of intersectionality.130
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court said that it “would be impossible”
to have a jury that “contain[s] representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political[,] and geographical groups of the community.”131 Yet, the way to get a representative jury is to increase the
size of the sample, so that it includes a critical mass of each group.132
The second source of measurement error involves jurors making
human mistakes whether from bad memory, inattention, incomprehension, distraction, or prejudice.133 One can conceive such errors as
outliers, in an otherwise well-working process of discernment.
Voir dire has long been one traditional solution to this concern that
a juror may be biased and unable to impartially resolve the facts of the
case.134 By questioning jurors and then excluding some, either for
cause or peremptorily, attorneys and judges are empowered to weed
out bias.135 However, the evidence suggests that jury challenges just
do not work. If, as is commonly done, challenges are based on jurors’
own statements that they can or cannot be fair, research shows that
prospective jurors are incapable of accurately assessing biases or reporting them to the court.136 If challenges are based on the hunches of
trial attorneys, research shows that they cannot reliably identify which
jurors will likely be adverse.137
gators, and scholars of color) to see some of the role of racial subordination within
policing and procedure.”).
130. See generally, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244
(1991) (“us[ing] the concept of intersectionality to denote the various ways in which
race and gender interact”).
131. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220.
132. See generally Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of
the Effects of Jury Size, 21 L. HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451 (1997).
133. See, e.g., Matthew Blackwell, James Honaker & Gary King, A Unified Approach to Measurement Error and Missing Data: Overview and Applications, 46 SOC.
METHODS & RSCH. 303, 304 (2015).
134. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (“Voir dire plays a
critical function in assuring the . . . right to an impartial jury will be honored.”); see
also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1894) (affirming the importance
of the opportunity to inspect jurors “for the due administration of justice”); Valerie P.
Hans, Challenges to Achieving Fairness in Civil Jury Selection, POUND CIV. JUST. INST.
14, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899957&dgcid=EJournal_
htmlemail_litigation:procedure:ejournal_abstractlink (Aug. 11, 2021) [https://
perma.cc/V9A8-RDGD].
135. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188.
136. See David V. Yokum, Christopher Robertson & Matt Palmer, The Inability to
Self-Diagnose Bias, 96 DENVER L. REV. 869, 869 (2019).
137. See DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING 46–48 (2012) (describing the
“pessimistic” findings of empirical research on attorney juror-picking).
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Even worse, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
voir dire habitually reduces the petit jury’s representativeness.138 Superficially, it may seem that giving both sides of a case the power to
challenge jurors counterbalances any problem, but that is incorrect
because the background distribution of traits in the jury pool is often
imbalanced. As Jeffrey Abramson explains, “the side targeting a minority religion or race or ethnic group for removal from the jury always has an advantage over the side furtively seeking to purge
members of the majority.”139 In a 2018 article, titled The Jim Crow
Jury, Thomas Ward Frampton recently “demonstrate[d] that the systematic exclusion of nonwhite jurors remains ubiquitous.”140
Although lawyers are not supposed to use race or gender in their
peremptory challenges,141 they need only give “a plausible reason,
even [if] an irrational one” as justification for any particular decision
to exclude a juror.142 Accordingly, even if luck produced a representative group of jurors on the basis of race or gender, it is not hard for
litigants to secure a jury consisting of 100% of their preferred race or
gender to decide the case.143 And, of course, race and gender are only
two protected classes; attorneys can and do use all sorts of other pernicious bases—e.g., religion or class—to strike jurors, further undermining the jury’s representative function.144
Some scholars have argued for the abolition of the peremptory
challenge, recognizing that it has no constitutional mandate (except
perhaps for criminal defendants).145 Other common law countries
138. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 485 (1990) (“[M]any groups are regularly excluded from the petit jury through peremptory challenge.”).
139. Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
125, 133 (1998).
140. Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1598
(2018).
141. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127,
145–46 (1994) (extending the Batson rule to gender).
142. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges: Reform Juries to Promote Impartiality, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Fall 2005, at 26, 28 (“[I]f . . . the prosecutor
offers any plausible reason, even an irrational one, the trial judge can reject the challenge to the peremptory strike.”); see also Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception and
Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 10–11 (1997); Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 715 (2018).
143. See, e.g., Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 2009) (denying Batson
relief, even where “every black person was removed from the jury panel, and the jury
that was eventually empaneled was composed entirely of white members”); Mitcham
v. Davis, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike every African American called to the jury box.”).
144. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (refusing to
extend Batson to peremptory challenges where the objection to the strike was based
on a person’s religion or religious affiliation).
145. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, A Call to Abolish Peremptory Challenges by Prosecutors, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1163, 1164 (2014); LaCrisha L.A. McAllister, Comment, Closing the Loophole: A Critical Analysis of the Peremptory Challenge and Why
It Should Be Abolished, 48 S.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2–3); see
also Ilya Somin, Derek Chauvin Jury Selection Process Highlights Need to Stop Dumb-
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have rejected the tool.146 Although they emerged from England, the
country ultimately abandoned peremptory challenges, finding that
they were irrational historical relics ill-suited to an ideally representative institution like the jury.147
In the United States, significantly, Arizona became the first state to
decide against allowing peremptory strikes in both civil and criminal
jury trials; the ban becomes effective in 2022.148 Aware of the social
science suggesting that eliminating peremptories “would help juries be
more reflective of the community and help eliminate discrimination or
unconscious bias,” Arizona’s Supreme Court changed the law.149
Given modern social science, the practice of challenging individual
jurors is obviously anachronistic. Imagine if a professional polling
company like Gallup, attempting to discern a population’s opinion on
some issue such as mask wearing, instructed pollsters to toss out a
certain number of respondents on nothing more than an intuition that
they may be biased. Likewise, the voir dire process tries in advance to
identify and remove potential jurors who the judge or a lawyer supposes is likely to render an inaccurate verdict.
A second approach operates ex post, when a trial judge or appellate
court supposes that a given jury’s decision is contrary to its own assessment of the “great weight of the evidence.” Under both the civil
and criminal rules of procedure, judges have a remarkable power to
throw out jury decisions—almost as if they were a thirteenth juror
with veto power.150 Since this power exists precisely for situations
ing Down Juries, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 18, 2021, 2:38 PM), https://reason.com/
volokh/2021/03/18/derek-chauvin-jury-selection-process-highlights-need-to-stopdumbing-down-juries/ [https://perma.cc/7X5U-SZLR] (highlighting how one criterion
used to dismiss jurors—knowledge about the case—may yield less informed, less impartial juries to the extent that jurors who lack knowledge of high-profile events are
systematically excluded).
146. See Eugene Tate, Ernest Hawrish & Stanley Clark, Communication Variables
in Jury Selection, 24 J. COMMC’N 130, 131, 134 (1974) (describing the vastly different
approaches in Canada and Britain, especially in civil cases).
147. See Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of Peremptory Challenges in the United
States and England, 6 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287, 313–14 (1988) (noting that parliament’s
primary rationale in doing away with peremptories was to preserve the random, or
representative, nature of jury selection).
148. Brenna Goth, Arizona Bans Use of Peremptory Strikes in State Jury Trials,
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 30, 2021, 6:01 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/arizona-bans-use-of-peremptory-strikes-in-state-jury-trials [https://perma.cc/
6REV-5PFC].
149. Id.
150. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A) (“The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on
all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court . . . .”); see Cassandra
Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 157, 161–62 (2008) (discussing the procedure for new trial in both civil and criminal cases and noting that it is
more common for state courts to “review the weight of the evidence”); see, e.g., Norton v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 567 S.E.2d 851, 854 (S.C. 2002) (“South Carolina’s thirteenth juror doctrine is so named because it entitles the trial judge to sit, in essence, as
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where the judge cannot identify any particular error that was made
during the jury trial or deliberations, Cassandra Burke Robertson has
aptly called this the doctrine of “invisible error.”151 It is arguably a
corrosive power, one which undermines the very purposes of having
jurors in the first place.152
Imagine a Gallup pollster throwing out results that do not cohere
with her own view, claiming that some “invisible error” in the first
sample’s results necessitates convening a second sample. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of the poll.
Rather than using such hunches to try to eliminate erroneous decisions ex ante (through voir dire) or ex post (through new trial motions), a more scientific approach to polling public perceptions is to
simply recruit a sample large enough to outvote the outliers, rendering
them sheer noise, distracting from the central tendency.153
Using modern tools of power analysis and confidence intervals (or
margins of error), scientists can estimate the range of values that cannot be reasonably rejected from the alternative hypothesis.154 All of
the values that fall within the confidence interval can be considered
consistent with the observed data. Values that fall outside the confidence interval can be rejected. Larger sample sizes yield more precise
estimates because each additional observation reduces the chance that
the outcome is due to lucky (or unlucky) draws from a given
population.
The ideal confidence level turns on our tolerance for error.155 If it
matters little how a case turns out, we might tolerate being right just
75% of the time. But if we want our legal system to send accurate
deterrence signals to primary actors, and if we wish to use the state’s
coercive power to redistribute resources only when necessary, we
might demand a much greater degree of accuracy—say, 99%. Scienthe thirteenth juror when he finds ‘the evidence does not justify the verdict,’ and then
to grant a new trial based solely ‘upon the facts.”’ (citation omitted)).
151. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Invisible Error, 50 CONN. L. REV. 161, 164
(2018).
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”). But see William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury,
54 SMU L. REV. 1695, 1719 (2001) (“The power of trial judges to grant new trials
because verdicts or particular jury findings are contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence is universally recognized and supported by ample common law precedent.”
(citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *387)).
153. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, OLIVIER SIBONY & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NOISE: A FLAW IN HUMAN JUDGMENT vii (2021).
154. Carmen R. Wilson VanVoorhis & Betsy L. Morgan, Understanding Power and
Rules of Thumb for Determining Sample Sizes, 3 TUTORIALS QUANTITATIVE METHODS FOR PSYCH. 43, 44–46 (2007). Note that we could have this discussion alternatively in terms of p-values or even Bayesian analysis, but confidence intervals help
illustrate the dynamics at different sample sizes.
155. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1477, 1511 (1999) (“There is no magic to the [5%] criterion . . . .”).
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tists routinely use 95% as the confidence level, which means they tolerate being wrong in roughly one in twenty cases.156 As an example,
we use that same threshold here, presuming that our legal system
should aim for at least this level of accuracy when rendering decisions
that collectively affect millions of lives and trillions of dollars.
Figure 1 illustrates the application of 95% confidence intervals to a
binary outcome (i.e., a verdict), with six or twelve jurors in the first
columns. With a hypothetical two-thirds of sampled jurors agreeing
that the plaintiff should recover, the confidence interval still overlaps
50%, meaning that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (i.e., that most
jurors in the population would favor the other side). In the given case,
at scientific levels of confidence, we cannot say that most potential
jurors would agree with the actual jurors assembled to hear the case.
The outcome may be due to sheer chance.

Percent of Jurors Voting for Plaintiff

FIGURE 1
100%

75%

50%

25%

0%
6

12

25

50

300

500

Number of Jurors

The columns in Figure 1 show the possible effects of alternative jury
sizes. More than doubling the sample to twenty-five jurors does not
raise the lower bound of the confidence interval above 50%. But with
a fifty-juror sample—if two-thirds still vote for the plaintiff—our confidence interval narrows such that we can predict that most others in
the community will cast a similar vote. With a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, we can then eliminate the possibility that our observed verdict for the plaintiff results from chance.
Courts could dynamically assign jury sizes to reach greater efficiencies. Larger juries are more important where the stakes are particularly high because the costs of error are higher. It is obviously worse,
from a social and individual perspective, to erroneously redistribute
$250 million than $25,000.
156. Id.
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Larger juries are also especially advantageous in close cases. If only
55% of jurors ultimately believe a defendant is liable, then a much
larger jury will be required to reject the null hypothesis than if 99% of
jurors believe a defendant is liable. In the latter case, a relatively small
jury will be sufficient to reject the alternative hypothesis (that most
jurors in the population would instead vote against liability). It is for
this reason that social scientists often undertake pilot studies to inform the optimal sample size for their pivotal study.157 Such tests can
be undertaken for civil trials—or sufficiently experienced judges can
gauge how close a case may be before assigning an appropriately
scaled jury.
Unless courts dynamically assign jury sizes, they would need a onesize-fits-all rule. It seems unlikely that six to twelve jurors are the optimal number, especially if we can reduce the costs of summonsing
more jurors (as our other reforms suggest). Fifty jurors might be reasonable. However, if we desire sufficient precision on not only the
binary liability outcomes but also the specific amount of awarded
damages, even larger juries will be necessary, perhaps numbering in
the hundreds or thousands per case. Jurors are, after all, notorious for
sometimes-wide-ranging damage assessments especially regarding
non-economic damages.158 In one realistic experiment, for instance,
the average juror award for pain and suffering was $2.9 million, but
the standard deviation was nearly $4.3 million.159 Statistical mechanisms can be used to aggregate responses and compress variability,
but larger numbers of jurors are nonetheless necessary to generate
scientifically reasonable damage estimates.160
Research suggests that jury service brings incidental benefits to jurors and society. Those who have served as jurors are more likely to
vote and report improved civic engagement.161 Larger juries could increase these benefits. Of course, to the extent that jury service is burdensome, expanding juries might increase this societal burden.
157. E.g., Edwin R. van Teijlingen & Vanora Hundley, The Importance of Pilot
Studies, SOCIOLOGY AT SURREY 1–4 (2001), https://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU35.PDF
[https://perma.cc/T2C7-4YRN].
158. Valerie F. Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award
Decision Making, 21 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 280, 280 (2015).
159. See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
301, 315–16 (1998).
160. See John Campbell, Bernard Chao, Christopher Robertson & David V.
Yokum, Countering the Plaintiff’s Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments, 101 IOWA L. REV. 543, 567 (2016).
161. John Gastil et al., Jury Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. POL. 351, 351, 359 (2008); see also Valerie P. Hans, John
Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 697 (2014) (While a “seven-state study of jury service and
voting records found no overall boost in civic engagement following service on civil
juries, . . . jurors who served on criminal cases did show increased civic engagement
following their jury service.”).
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Considered alone, the prospect of larger juries raises several logistical questions. Where would fifty or more jurors sit? Who would pay
the additional costs? How could they possibly deliberate? These
problems dissolve if some or all our complementary reforms are
adopted.
B. Asynchronous Video Presentation
A jury trial is not unlike a play. By analogy, the courthouse is the
theater, the attorneys and witnesses the actors, the judge the director,
and the jurors the audience. When the common law jury was conceived by the Founders’ British predecessors, such live, face-to-face
entertainment was the norm. (The telegraph was not invented until
1844,162 the telephone until 1876,163 and the television until 1927.164)
Although the raw technologies have now existed for decades, it was
not until the advent of online video-streaming in the 2000s, followed
by its widespread diffusion in the 2010s, that it became practically and
economically feasible to record and edit trials for juries to watch and
decide individual cases. Now, attorneys can record and edit high-definition video using the phones in their pockets or the computers at
their desks. At higher levels of professionalism, involving dedicated
cameras, videographers, and editors, it is now possible to produce
quality videos at relatively low costs.
Suppose that, instead of producing live trials, courts created highquality videos capturing all aspects of a trial, including opening arguments, testimonial and documentary evidence, closing arguments, and
the judge’s instructions. Even before the COVID–19 pandemic, we
had several proofs of concept. In extant civil litigation, it has long
been routine to video-record depositions in all but the smallest
cases.165 When a witness cannot attend a live trial, or when a party
seeks to use prior testimony to impeach a witness, these videos are
often edited and played at trial. Similarly, jury researchers often use
video stimuli to represent the trial process.166 As early as 1994, one
scholar argued that the notion of the “video trial” was gaining support.167 And—as Part II makes clear—the coronavirus pandemic has
drawn great interest toward trial by videoconference.
162. Morse Code & the Telegraph, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/topics/
inventions/telegraph (June 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XWD4-ZQX8].
163. Who Is Credited with Inventing the Telephone?, LIBR. CONG. (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.loc.gov/everyday-mysteries/item/who-is-credited-with-inventing-the-telephone/ [https://perma.cc/75GH-CR6N].
164. Sarah Pruitt, Who Invented Television?, HISTORY.COM (June 29, 2021), https://
www.history.com/news/who-invented-television [https://perma.cc/YQA9-TGAL].
165. Perritt, supra note 55, at 1071.
166. Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, The Effect of Blinded Experts
on Juror Verdicts, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 765, 765 (2012) (reviewing this
literature).
167. Perritt, supra note 55, at 1071–72.
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Video trials yield several potential advantages. First, video-editing
allows evidentiary presentation to be more condensed and, therefore,
focused. The current debate on whether and how courts should limit
trial time evinces perceptions that modern trials largely waste the time
of everyone involved.168 Indeed, raw testimony involves plenty of proverbial throat-clearing, parrying, dodging, and repeating. In contrast,
the use of video depositions in today’s trials shows how they can be
condensed from raw material consuming, say, seven hours (or more)
to just an hour or so, featuring only the key testimony that each party
designates as most essential.169 This distillation obviously offers increased efficiency. Concision may also improve accuracy by improving
juror attention and comprehension. Eliminating extraneous testimony
lessens the risk that jurors will grow bored, confused, or distracted.
Second, an edited video trial allows the court to resolve objections
to improper evidence or arguments in advance. In major cases, judges
often use pre-trial Daubert hearings to similarly proscribe what experts may and may not say.170 For many other issues, however, parties
must object during trial once a purportedly objectionable piece of evidence is offered, often in front of the jury but ideally at sidebar. This
process wastes more jury time and risks contaminating the jury by exposing it to improper evidence. In contrast, in video trials, objections
can be resolved in advance, and if sustained, improper material can be
edited out. These procedures are already used for parties to designate
and register objections to video depositions in standard trials. The
technique could be expanded to cover a complete video trial.
Decades of social science research suggest it is ineffective or even
counterproductive to tell jurors to ignore material they have already
but erroneously seen.171 The primary advantage of these approaches is
to vindicate and reinforce the Rules of Evidence; a properly edited
video virtually eliminates the risk that a jury will be exposed to inappropriate material that might contribute to an erroneous decision.
Even “live” online trials could include a five-or-so second delay—not
168. See Stephen D. Susman & Richard L. Jolly, An Empirical Study on Jury Trial
Innovations, CIV. JURY PROJECT 101, 103 (Feb. 2017), https://civiljuryproject.law.
nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/sds-rlj_Empircal-Study-on-Trial-Innovations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R73Y-E59M] (arguing for time limits on trials).
169. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (Generally, “a deposition is limited to one day of
[seven] hours.”); see also Estate of Spear v. Comm’r, 41 F.3d 103, 116 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“Although live testimony is generally preferable to videotaped testimony, the absence of such testimony, even from a key witness, is only minimally prejudicial when
that witness is adverse and when there is a videotaped deposition that can be introduced in lieu of live testimony.”).
170. See, e.g., Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 822 F.3d 194, 201 (5th
Cir. 2016) (reversing and remanding after “the district court disregarded its gatekeeping function to determine the admissibility of evidence outside of the presence of the
jury”).
171. See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 477
(2006) https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-006-9039-7.
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unlike delays already used in live television broadcasting172—to enable court staff to omit objections.
Third, a video trial would allow jurors to simply rewind a video to
refresh their memories when deciding cases. During deliberations, today’s courts sometimes provide trial transcripts or excerpts thereof,
but these lack key markers of witness credibility (e.g., physical demeanor), which is a primary consideration for jurors.173 Indeed, courts
regularly discourage juries from an overreliance on transcripts: “The
transcript is not authoritative. If you remember something different
from what appears in the transcripts, your collective recollection is
controlling.”174 A huge body of research suggests that human memory
is far from perfect and—arguably—now obsolete since technologies
like video recording are now widely available.175
Fourth, video-taped materials can be reused within the judicial system. Appellate courts often complain that they cannot evaluate aspects of a witness’s demeanor at trial. This inability to view the actual
trial is often cited as a primary reason why trial courts are “given
much deference.”176 Rather than poring through “cold” transcripts,177
courts of appeals can simply watch videos, thereby seeing the same
thing as the trial judge.
There may be other reasons for general deference to lower courts,
but reversals will nonetheless be necessary at times. Video trials can
dramatically reduce the costs of remanding to correct an error. For
example, suppose that an appellate court determines that the trial
judge erred in excluding certain testimony. The testimony can simply
be reinserted and the case played out before another set of jurors
rather than remanding the case and having the court conduct another
172. E.g., Matt Carey, ABC to Impose Delay on Oscar Telecast, CNN (Feb. 5, 2004,
9:13 AM), http://us.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/Movies/02/05/sprj.aa04.abc.oscar.delay/
[https://perma.cc/9KQ5-32JG].
173. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 198 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“No such determination of credibility is possible when the witness comes before the
trial factfinder by the reading of a cold transcript.”); see also Tennant v. Peoria & P.
U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (“It is the jury, not the court, which is the factfinding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to
the facts.”).
174. United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
instructions the district court provided for the jury).
175. See generally Daniel L. Schacter & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory and Law:
What Can Cognitive Neuroscience Contribute?, 16 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 119, 119
(2013).
176. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479 (2008) (citation omitted).
177. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 343 (2006) (“Appellate judges cannot on the
basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s decision . . . .”); United States
v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5, 17 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Only rarely—and in extraordinarily
compelling circumstances—will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse
a district court’s on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative
value and unfair effect.” (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340
(1st Cir. 1988)).
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jury trial, which might consume years of time and millions of dollars.178 Saving time would be especially important in actual-innocence
cases involving wrongful imprisonment.
Or suppose that the case is part of a mass tort, involving hundreds
or thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the common issues (e.g., defendant conduct) each plaintiff may need to prove
specific facts (e.g., whether they relied on the misrepresentation, or
whether a certain chemical caused their injuries). Accordingly, the
main body of the case can be optimized in the video trial for reuse in
every subsequent case with a different module inserted for evidence
specific to each plaintiff. This procedure would be much more efficient than conducting a live trial for each plaintiff.
One limitation of asynchronous video trials is that jurors will be
unable to inject their own questions into trial—an important innovation of trial practice.179 The court, or litigants themselves, may instead
generate and resolve such questions from mock jurors before finalizing the trial video, thereby ensuring that the most common questions
get answered. This limitation would not, of course, apply in live, online trials where video is merely offered to jurors after trial and during
deliberation. Indeed, in live trials, jurors’ abilities to submit questions
may be enhanced, because they will be able to non-intrusively type
and submit their questions while watching the trial in a private manner that might well cause them to hesitate less than during an in-person trial. Relatedly, submitting questions to a court technician over
the Internet may be less intimidating for jurors.180
Another potential limitation involves the risk of improper editing
such that the videos the jurors see are not actually representative of
the evidence. This concern has already been surmounted in the use of
video depositions at trial, and it could easily be surmounted in videotaped trials as well: The trial judge would give both parties a chance to
preview the materials and to submit objections about material that
was improperly included or excluded. Such trial decisions will, of
course, be subject to appellate review with the typical deferential standard for trial management and evidentiary decisions.
A final group of concerns are psychological. We have already mentioned one such consideration: that unwatched jurors are less responsible jurors. But there are several other considerations.
First, video trials may be less engaging than physical ones. The literature on online education is instructive. One recent review of the liter178. For an analogous approach, see D. Alex Winkelman et al., An Empirical
Method for Harmless Error, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1405, 1405 (2014) (testing variations on
the same trial to determine whether an error was harmless).
179. See Susman & Jolly, supra note 168, at 110–11.
180. See Michael Shammas, Thoughts on Optimizing Time & Attention in Virtual
Trials, CIV. JURY PROJECT (July 9, 2020), https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/the-trialof-counting-trials-2/ [https://perma.cc/DRU9-TEVK].
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ature concludes that “[t]aken as a whole, there is robust evidence to
suggest [that] online learning is generally at least as effective as the
traditional format.”181 Thus, for the cognitive purpose of imparting
understanding, it seems that video is no impediment.182 The past year
has provided further evidence that online teaching environments can
be generally effective if properly produced.
Video trials could be optimized to use best practices from the educational context. For example, educators have found that “spaced”
learning is ideal.183 Courts could accordingly release segments of trial
videos in a pre-planned, timed manner to optimize focus and attention. Some research suggests that the ideal attention span is about
twenty-five minutes, with five-minute breaks interspersed throughout
to give the brain time to consolidate information.184 Even if courts are
unlikely to make live online sessions that short, judges should consider
using frequent breaks to avoid “Zoom fatigue” during synchronous
hearings and trials.185
Second, video testimony may be less emotionally arousing than
physical testimony. (Picture jurors sitting feet away from a sobbing
plaintiff.) Summarizing the literature, Susan Bandes and Jessica Salerno write that “there is some evidence that videotaped testimony
181. Tuan Nguyen, The Effectiveness of Online Learning: Beyond No Significant
Difference and Future Horizons, 11 MERLOT J. ONLINE LEARNING & TEACHING
309, 309 (2015).
182. Another commonsense safeguard when crucial monologues like jury instructions are delivered virtually—aside from making them especially concise and clear—
involves making trial video available so that daydreaming jurors can fill in gaps in
their knowledge. It may also be advisable to send each juror a transcript of important
monologues like jury instructions.
183. Cf. Praveen Shrestha, Ebbinghaus Forgetting Curve, PSYCHESTUDY (Nov. 17,
2017), https://www.psychestudy.com/cognitive/memory/ebbinghaus-forgetting-curve
[https://perma.cc/C2XJ-55PQ] (The “Ebbinghaus forgetting curve describes the decrease in ability of the brain to retain memory over time.”); see also Harvey Singh,
What Is Spaced Learning & (Why Does It Matter) in eLearning?, INSTANCY (Jan. 13,
2021), https://www.instancy.com/blog/what-is-spaced-learning/ [https://perma.cc/
MF4B-9WHN] (“Ebbinghaus hypothesized the Forgetting Curve and introduced the
spacing effect.” So with the spaced-learning “approach of teaching, learners can retain
the information taught in [a] course.”).
184. Alan Henry, Productivity 101: An Introduction to the Pomodoro Technique,
LIFEHACKER (July 12, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://lifehacker.com/productivity-101-a-primer-to-the-pomodoro-technique-1598992730 [https://perma.cc/NJ5Y-Z5C7]; see generally ADAM GAZZALEY & LARRY D. ROSEN, THE DISTRACTED MIND: ANCIENT
BRAINS IN A HIGH-TECH WORLD xiii–xvi (2016); see also Loren Dunn, The
Pomodoro-Technique and 3 More Research-Backed Study Tips, FORBES (Apr. 26,
2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/noodleeducation/2016/04/26/thepomodoro-technique-and-3-more-research-backed-study-tips/?sh=6257eeb85027
[https://perma.cc/2CK3-ELBJ] (“Check out the Pomodoro Technique, just one of
many tools that can help to combat procrastination, in this case by breaking study
sessions into manageable pieces.”).
185. Liz Fosslien & Mollie West Duffy, How to Combat Zoom Fatigue, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/04/how-to-combat-zoom-fatigue [https://
perma.cc/8PDQ-P6XN].
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evokes less empathy than in-court testimony, though video also
presents opportunities for close-ups and other artistry that might ameliorate the effect of the decision maker’s lack of proximity to the
witness.”186
Yet videos can be quite emotionally arousing. After all, the potential for such arousal is the exact rationale that judges use today when
excluding certain video presentations (for example, victim-impact
statements and day-in-the-life videos) that may be too emotionally
arousing.187 Even if video does mute emotional arousal, it is unclear
whether this counts as a disadvantage.188 The Supreme Court has said
that “[t]he jury system is premised on the idea that rationality and
careful regard for the court’s instructions will confine and exclude jurors’ raw emotions.”189 Indeed, as Federal Rule of Evidence 403’s distinction between the probative and the prejudicial reflects, emotion is
a hallmark of unfair prejudice.190 Video, especially carefully edited
video, may facilitate an appropriate degree of dispassionate consideration of evidence.
C. Shorter, Edited Trials
The 2021 Academy Award winner for best picture, Nomadland, is
12 minutes shy of two hours.191 The 2020 Academy Award winner for
best picture, Parasite, is 132 minutes.192 The 2019 Academy Award
winner, Green Book, is 130 minutes.193 The 2018 winner, The Shape of
Water, is 123 minutes.194 The success of these award-winning films
suggests that a rich, comprehensive story can be told in a matter of
hours.
186. Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The
Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1003, 1040 (2014) (internal citation omitted); see also Susan A. Bandes & Neal
Feigenson, Empathy and Remote Legal Proceedings, 51 SW. L. REV. (forthcoming
Dec. 2021).
187. Bandes & Salerno, supra note 187 at 1040–41.
188. See generally Dan Simon, In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING 131–48 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
189. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 841 (2009).
190. Bandes & Salerno, supra note 186, at 1006 (first quoting Lisa Kern Griffin,
Narrative, Truth and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 314 n.181 (2012); then quoting Victor J.
Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 503 (1983)).
191. Nomadland, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt9770150/ [https://perma.cc/
8MNN-VMR7].
192. Parasite, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6751668/ [https://perma.cc/
5D6K-VD58].
193. Green Book, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt6966692/ [https://perma.cc/
X8DS-XFCN].
194. The Shape of Water, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt5580390/ [https:/
perma.cc/K7J7-4WSZ].
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We have already suggested that one benefit of asynchronous video
trials is that, by eliminating extraneous material, they facilitate somewhat shorter trials than live trials. This benefit might yield trials that
are on average 20% or even 40% shorter than current trials. But it is
worth considering whether the length and format of trials should be
even more profoundly changed.
Currently, trials—both criminal and civil—consist of each side giving an opening statement before calling witnesses, displaying documentary and physical evidence, and delivering a closing argument.
Under this time-honored format, key evidence is typically shared
three times (through opening statements, testimonial and documentary evidence, and closing statements), and key jury instructions are
given at least twice (first by both attorneys and then by the judge).
The repetition is worthwhile if the trial is going to stretch into days
and weeks but may well be unnecessary in a shorter presentation. Instead, what if an entire two-week trial were condensed into, say, a 130minute video, including evidentiary highlights from each side (e.g.,
video clips of testimony), and incorporating succinct yet clear jury
instructions?
Litigators already give condensed closing arguments that integrate
the court’s legal instructions and highlight key evidence often in an
hour or less. Whether juror accuracy is enhanced by watching the entire trial in addition to the closing arguments—which already concisely summarize the relevant evidence and the proper legal
standard—is an open empirical question. Closing arguments alone
may be sufficient.
Scholars have long advocated for (and courts have recently experimented with) instructing jurors on the elements of the legal cause of
action earlier during the trial itself.195 This reform would help jurors
make legal sense of the factual evidence they hear. Courts are also
experimenting with letting litigants introduce witnesses to explain
their testimony’s relevance to the case. A closing argument inherently
accomplishes both functions.
Research on decision-making suggests that people typically do not
withhold judgment until the very end of the process of receiving information.196 They instead make an early assessment and—with the receipt of additional information—selectively assimilate that
195. E.g., Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 451 (2006); Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury
Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 688 (2000).
196. See Reid Hastie, The Role of “Stories” in Civil Jury Judgments, 32 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 227, 238 (1999) (“[J]urors’ judgments are based on summaries of the
evidence structed as chronological narratives.”); see also Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, RAND 1 (1989), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3832.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMJ3-ZXBS]
(“[D]espite judges’ instructions to the contrary, many jurors form tentative verdict
preferences early in the trial[.]”).
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information to accord with their initial judgment.197 This process
makes it unlikely that adding a 131st minute, a 141st minute, or even
several hundred more minutes of trial time could change the average
juror’s decision for the better. Each additional minute yields diminishing marginal utility. At some point, more minutes—even ones featuring completely novel, useful information—exert negative effects,
including fatigue, distraction, boredom, or irritability.
Of course, complex cases involving more parties or technical evidence will continue to require longer trials.198 Videos created for such
complex cases may optimally feature running times more akin to
epics—Gandhi (191 minutes)199 or Gone with the Wind (226 minutes)200—than action films. Nonetheless, our experience advising parties to complex cases and observing oral advocacy at the appellate and
trial levels suggests that most litigants can make a coherent case
within an hour or so.
Aside from efficiency and accuracy, due process requires sufficient
time for litigants to tell their own stories and get a fair hearing.201
Nonetheless, courts have for decades exercised their powers to place
reasonable limits on trial time.202 The question is not whether to limit
the video trial time, but rather, how much condensation is appropriate
if justice is to be done in any one case.
D. Breaking Time & Place Limitations
If the foregoing reforms are implemented such that radically shortened trials are conducted by video, the geography of trials can be
rethought. Presently, to stage live, physical trials, the lawyers, judge,
witnesses, jurors, and court staff are all forced to be in the exact same
place at the exact same time. Witnesses must travel from the opposite
side of the world if they can even be subpoenaed to appear at all.203 In
major cases, each side may bring dozens of personnel (including law197. See MacCoun, supra note 196, at 2–3.
198. Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131,
2134 (2018) (reviewing evidence that trials have become shorter in recent years but
that a few protracted trials are still conducted every year).
199. Gandhi, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083987/ [https://perma.cc/
QG7S-RRV6].
200. Gone with the Wind, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0031381/ [https://
perma.cc/WDE3-7K2Z].
201. Compare John E. Rumel, The Hourglass and Due Process: The Propriety of the
Time Limits on Civil Trials, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 237, 238 (1992) (“Trial judges must
consider . . . due process rights and interests when establishing time limits . . . .”), with
Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Trouble with Trial Time Limits, 106 GEO. L.J. 933, 933
(2018) (“[A] limit can, theoretically, be so strict and arbitrary that its imposition constitutes a violation of due process . . . .”).
202. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(O) (allowing the court to “establish[ ] a reasonable
limit on the time allowed to present evidence”).
203. See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)(A)–(B) (allowing witnesses to be subpoenaed if
nearby).
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yers, presentation consultants, paralegals, and support staff) to a trial
site in a remote federal courthouse (e.g., the Eastern District of Texas,
Sherman Division) and live there for a month or longer. The practical
difficulty of aligning all those schedules against professional and personal obligations, as well as exigent circumstances like health or
weather emergencies, often causes trials to be cancelled or rescheduled to a later date (i.e., “continued”).
Video potentially enhances efficiency—in terms of both travel costs
and opportunity costs—reducing the delays that accompany continuances. The attorneys, witnesses, and judge may perform their functions at convenient times and places (for them) while the jurors can
also perform their duties at another convenient time and place.
Physically convening jurors entails substantial monetary and opportunity costs. Jurors will often prefer to serve at home or the office or a
nearby library. Such a change may be less expensive in direct costs
(e.g., a bus fare or parking), indirect costs (e.g., childcare), and opportunity costs (e.g., lost wages) than traveling to a courthouse. And they
would often prefer to schedule their service at a convenient time,
which may well be different than that imagined by the judge or other
parties. Perhaps after dinner or during a slow morning at work?
Currently, thousands of potential jurors are excused for hardship,
sometimes after suffering the difficulty of having to appear at court to
plead with the judge.204 Many others serve despite some level of hardship that is nonetheless insufficient for excusal.205 By reducing the
barriers to service, this change could secure a more representative jury
willing and able to serve.
Not long ago, Americans conducted all manner of routine tasks
downtown, from voting to renewing a driver’s license. Such tasks are
increasingly completed remotely. Most states now offer online vehicle
registration that is making trips to the DMV a thing of the past.206 As
of early 2021, five states conduct elections solely by mail; thirty-four
204. See Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Impairment of the Fair Cross-Section of the Community, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 159
(1995) (“A significant number of citizens avoid jury service by means of a system of
excuses an occupational exemptions that defers to claims of ‘hardship.’ ”); see also
Hiroshi Fukarai & Edgar W. Butler, Organization, Labor Force, and Jury Representation: Economic Excuses and Jury Participation, 32 JURIMETRICS J.L. SCI. & TECH. 49,
51 (1991) (“[T]he disproportionate jury representation caused by excuses for economic hardship undermines the legitimacy of the jury system and of jury verdicts in
the eyes of citizens.”).
205. Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223–24 (1946) (holding that “[a] juror shall
not be excused by a court for slight or trivial causes, or for hardship, or for inconvenience to said juror’s business, but only when material injury or destruction to said
juror’s property or of property entrusted to said juror is threatened” (citation omitted)); cf. id. (“[A] federal judge would be justified in excusing a daily wage earner for
whom jury service would entail an undue financial hardship.”).
206. See Vehicle Registration Laws by State, FINDLAW, https://www.findlaw.com/
traffic/drivers-license-vehicle-info/state-vehicle-registration-information.html (June
20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/62BE-M59Z].
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states and the District of Columbia permit qualified voters to cast
mail-in ballots.207
As noted above, the COVID–19 pandemic caused some courts to
adapt. For example, the Yolo County Superior Court permitted “potential jurors to respond to summons by Zoom or phone,” while also
promulgating “easy step-by-step instructions” featuring “hyperlinked—and quite large—buttons” for jurors to click to submit their
reply to summons.208 Courts that move to online trials or hearings
might also benefit from “creating a technological ‘Jury Service Staff’
available to answer questions by phone or email.”209
With high-speed Internet, customized video can now be reliably delivered at little cost. Citizens can watch proceedings via a variety of
devices including laptops, tablets, smartphones, and smart-home devices. A basic 7” tablet with video-streaming capability can be purchased for $40—less than one day’s minimum wage.210 Nearly 60% of
Americans now pay for video-streaming services like Netflix.211
Admittedly, a digital divide persists. Indigent and rural Americans
disproportionately lack access to high-speed Internet and networkready devices.212 But these problems are not insurmountable. For example, such citizens could travel to their nearest public library or
courthouse. Alternatively, there may be ways to mail them loaner devices with cellular-data capabilities.
When jurors serve from home in online trials, it may be difficult to
monitor whether they are having ex parte conversations or consulting
extraneous materials. On the other hand, using larger sample sizes in
concert with shorter trials might make other sorts of misconduct more
difficult. For instance, our reforms make it largely infeasible for litigants to find—much less contact—jurors whose service may be limited to an hour or two. Similarly, serving from home or the office
creates a risk that jurors will be interrupted by the mailman, a co207. Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail, and Other Voting at
Home Options, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Sept. 24, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/
8V64-ZYSJ].
208. Online Jury Trials Are Possible, supra note 58.
209. Id.
210. E.g., Vankyo MatrixPad Z1 7” Tablet, THE STORE, https://thestore.com/p/refurbished-vankyo-matrixpad-z1-7-tablet-android-81-oreo-go-32gb-emmcr-ips-hd-display-wi-fi-bluetooth-black-ts686494611399r?roistat=Merchant3_g_
80086369672_online%3Aen%3AUS%3A87723&roistat_referrer,roistat_pos,gclid=
EAIaIQobChMIpeei0LDz8QIVtW1vBB3vlQN_EAQYASABEgKoqPD_BwE
[https://perma.cc/LQH4-8ZC8].
211. Steve Liesman, Nearly 60% of Americans Are Streaming and Most with Netflix: CNBC Survey, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/29/nearly-60-percent-ofamericans-are-streaming-and-most-with-netflix-cnbc-survey.html (Mar. 29, 2018, 1:26
PM) [https://perma.cc/63FN-WRXE].
212. See A. Scheerder, Alexander van Deursen & Jan van Dijk, Determinants of
Internet Skills, Uses and Outcomes. A Systematic Review of the Second- and ThirdLevel Digital Divide, 34 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 1607, 1608 (2017).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL106.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 37

THE JURY TRIAL REINVENTED

15-NOV-21

13:19

145

worker, a pet, or any number of other things. Of course, for short
interruptions, they can simply pause their video and resume when
ready. Although interruptions are usually bad, due to spaced learning,
intentional interruptions could actually benefit overall accuracy.213
Courts could ship jurors low-cost tablets, formatted both to prevent
other tasks from being performed concurrently on the devices and to
enable court personnel to monitor jurors’ actions.214 Going further,
the use of virtual-reality goggles will become increasingly feasible.215
The devices can detect when users remove them, and the virtual-reality experience is substantially more engaging than video.216 A virtualreality headset also moots concerns that jurors might engage in distracting behavior during trial and deliberation while lessening the risk
of a juror impermissibly recording the trial. (This is because (1) unlike
with a traditional screen, it is nearly impossible to use a phone or portable camera to record what is playing on a virtual-reality headset; and
(2) courts could prophylactically disable the recording functions on
virtual-reality devices.)
Our time-and-place reform can also be applied dynamically, much
like jury sequestration is currently applied on a case-by-case basis. For
most routine cases, it may be harmless and efficient for jurors to serve
at locations of their choosing. In the wake of COVID–19, Yolo
County took care to include in its guidelines “that every hearing or
proceeding that can be done virtually is done virtually, including jury
orientation and hardship hearings.”217
A more general concern relates to the seriousness and solemnity of
the trial.218 Unless jurors are required to be physically present in a
courthouse to view video or other digital evidence, they could feel a
lack of gravity that might undermine the accuracy of their decisions.
As of now, the problem is largely speculative; research is needed on
this question to both quantify the problem and test potential solutions,
213. Shrestha, supra note 183.
214. See supra Part III(D).
215. See Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Jury Glasses: Wearable
Technology and Its Role in Crowdsourcing Justice, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
115, 118 (2015) (arguing for reforms that “could reduce judicial backlogs, temper . . .
attempts to avoid participation in dispute resolution, promote legal cognizance, and
improve community participation, in addition to reducing the prevalence of personal
bias in decision making”); see also Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods for
a Traditional Setting: The Use of Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the
Courtroom, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 117, 117 (2016).
216. See Salmanowitz, supra note 215, at 142–43 (“[I]mmersive virtual environments would likely generate stronger, longer-lasting effects due to their more vicarious and life-like nature.”).
217. Online Jury Trials Are Possible, supra note 58.
218. Marder, supra note 55, at 264–65 (“The architecture of the courtroom, with
actors in their designated places, the formality of the procedures, and the presence of
the parties who will be affected by the jury’s verdict, remind jurors of the seriousness
of their task. An online mock juror lacks such a setting.”).
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including virtual representation of the same factors, such as architecture, that support solemnity in the courtroom.
In exigent circumstances, like a pandemic, remote service could
mitigate the risks and anxiety of physical proximity.219 More generally, this reform serves efficiency by reducing costs for jurors to serve.
In doing so, the reform could also marginally enhance the jury’s chief
functions of accuracy and democratic engagement, if it improves the
representativeness of the jurors able to serve.
E. A National Jury Pool for National Civil Cases
The foregoing section recommends breaking the geographic link between jurors and the courthouse, allowing jurors to serve from their
public libraries, their offices, or even their homes. This reform begs
another question: When, for a given case, the alleged wrongdoing has
a national scope, why should the jury deciding the case be limited to
one judicial district? Moving to remote video trials could enable national jury pools in cases of national importance, as some have
suggested.220
To be sure, local juries are appropriate for local cases. Local trials
reflect “the community’s interest in local autonomy when it comes to
judging crimes [or torts or contract breaches] committed on its
soil.”221 A local jury may well bring local community values, and perhaps some common sense about relevant local facts, like how busy a
particular town’s intersection may be, as it relates to a car accident
there.
However, in cases where a party is a national or multinational corporation, and the relevant behaviors (like price fixing, patent litigation, or product safety) are also national, it is inappropriate for the
case to be resolved by a jury located in one particular part of one
particular state, which may have peculiar biases, values, or experiences that are nationally unrepresentative. Cases against corporations
are often tried in their hometowns, which may be dominated by their
own workers (and a broader local economy that depends on them),
even though the corporate behavior affects consumers or stockholders
219. Wilson, supra note 104, at 68–69 (noting that juries deliberating during
coronavirus may have felt rushed and been less representative due to differential
levels of concern about COVID–19 felt by different ethnicities and partisans).
220. See Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen
Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 411 (2008) (advocating
for national pools to “eliminate incentives for parties to forum-shop [that] would
make the decisionmaking body representative of the population that will feel the effects of its decision”); see also Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the
Choice of Law Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 374 (2011) (suggesting a similar solution for choice of law
issues in class action litigation); Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL
Revolution, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11, 72 (2021) (noting the impact that jury trials
might have on the development of multidistrict litigation).
221. Abramson, supra note 139, at 152.
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nationwide. Such an imbalance in jury representativeness could skew
their view of the facts.
Indeed, scholars, courts, and litigants have expressed concern that
“sympathetic [local] jury pools” are unrepresentative and that the current system creates incentives for litigants to “forum shop” for
favorable jurisdictions.222 Even when outside their hometowns, major
companies have sought to exploit their repeat-player status by funding
extravagant charitable works like ice-skating rinks for the enjoyment
of the local population (i.e., the jury pool).223
In other cases, the problem is flipped: A local jury is hostile to a
litigant.224 Take the case of Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, the
Houston company that collapsed after a spectacular case of securities
fraud.225 As it crumbled, many Houstonians with Enron-tied retirement accounts lost their entire life savings, and several potential jurors
reported personally knowing people injured by Enron’s fraud.226 Relatedly, some scholars have argued that when “the local population
[has] a vested interest in the outcome of the case, . . . [a] presumption
of bias should extend to the entire community.”227 Yet the Supreme
Court ultimately affirmed Skilling’s conviction.228 Its decision relied
on little more than the jurors’ reassurances, rendered under pressure
from the trial judge, that they could be “fair and impartial.”229
Given the findings of modern psychology, such potentially biased
local trials seem medieval and—with modern communications technology—completely unnecessary.230 For federal criminal cases, the
Sixth Amendment’s Vicinage Clause requires that juries be drawn
from the state or federal district where the crime was committed,231
222. Alisha Kay Taylor, Comment, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570,
583 (2007); see also Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of
Texas Draws Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 299, 301–02 (“One of the oft-cited reasons for the District’s popularity, as well
as its undeserved reputation, has been the allegedly ‘plaintiff-friendly juries’ who are
‘predisposed to find for plaintiffs and award large damages.’” (internal citations
omitted)).
223. Anthony Zurcher, Why a Small Town in Texas Had Samsung’s Ear, BBC
NEWS (May 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40021491 [https://
perma.cc/G223-694X].
224. See Victor E. Schwartz, Sherman Joyce & Cary Silverman, West Virginia as a
Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV.
757, 758 (2009).
225. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 367–68 (2010).
226. Id.
227. Jordan Gross, If Skilling Can’t Get a Change of Venue, Who Can? Salvaging
Common Law Implied Bias Principles from the Wreckage of the Constitutional Pretrial
Publicity Standard, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 620 (2013).
228. Skilling, 561 U.S. at 367–68.
229. Id.
230. See Yokum et al., supra note 136, at 871–72 (detailing the failure of selfdiagnosis).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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and we acknowledge that using national jury pools for criminal cases
may be more difficult than in civil cases. In our analysis in Part IV
below, we argue that for such cases, however, federal criminal juries
should at the very least become district or state-wide because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure narrow vicinage much more than
the Sixth Amendment requires.232
F. Vote-Aggregation Without Deliberation
The book and movie 12 Angry Men popularized the notion that
through passionate argumentation and obdurate insistence, a minority
of jurors, or even one heroic holdout, can save a jury from an unjust
verdict.233 The jury deliberation has been romantically described as
“collecting people together into a conversation fed by difference but
fueled by a search for common ground.”234
The reality is quite different. As Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel
argued, based on their collected data from actual juries and trial
judges, deliberation “might well be likened to what the developer
does for an exposed film; it brings out the picture, but the outcome is
predetermined.”235 Indeed, far from empowering holdouts as in 12
Angry Men, the typical function of jury deliberation is to (eventually)
enable the majority to outvote the minority, just as Condorcet recommends.236 In more recent work, Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper
conclude that “the median [individual juror award pre-deliberation] is
the best single predictor of the jury’s final verdict.”237 Consistent with
Kalven and Zeisel’s findings from the 1960s, this more recent work
suggests that jury deliberations do little more than consume time—
hours, days, and sometimes weeks—while delaying an inevitable outcome that could have been gleaned by a simple mathematical aggregation of each juror’s individual vote.238 For this reason, leading jury
scholars typically take the median vote of mock jurors as predictive of
trial outcomes.239
232. See infra Part IV.
233. Jason D. Reichelt, Standing Alone: Conformity, Coercion, and the Protection
of the Holdout Juror, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 569, 570 (2007).
234. Abramson, supra note 139, at 160.
235. MacCoun, supra note 196, at 2–3 (citation omitted).
236. CONDORCET, supra note 116.
237. Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513, 546
(1992); see also S. Femi Sonaike, The Influence of Jury Deliberation on Juror Perception of Trial, Credibility, and Damage Awards, 1978 BYU L. REV. 889, 902 (1978)
(finding that the median was better than the mean).
238. Diamond & Casper, supra note 237, at 559.
239. E.g., NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 197
(1995); see also Campbell et al., supra note 160, at 557. But see David Schkade, Cass
R. Sunstein & Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1152–53 (2000) (finding higher punitive damages awards compared to the median of individual votes); Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Cass
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But it is not just a function of jurors being outvoted; they are often
ground down by social pressure. In a classic 1950s experiment, Solomon Ash demonstrated a “conformity” effect.240 A group of participants were tasked with publicly estimating which of three lines
matched the length of a separate line.241 The task was repeated several times.242 Unbeknownst to one person—the actual subject—all the
other participants were hired staff, or “confederates.”243 These confederates publicly gave their answers—which were clearly incorrect—
before the research participant was asked to answer.244 On average,
three of four participants eventually began parroting the confederates.245 This classic work has been successfully replicated and extended.246 More recent work suggests that social pressure is a bigger
cause of people changing opinions than the exchange of
information.247
Even when there is diversity of initial viewpoints, people usually
focus on points of agreement—a tendency known as shared-information bias.248 Discussion, in turn, highlights agreed-upon positions,
which reinforces confidence in those beliefs.249 Occasionally, the
group’s final collective position becomes substantially more extreme
than that of any single individual.250
Notwithstanding this evidence, the classic story is that vigorous jury
deliberation enhances jury accuracy and mitigates biases. There exists
a rich social-science literature on group deliberation, which is only
gestured at here.251 Its implications are not promising. Said Sunstein:
R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49, 72–75 (1998).
240. Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 3
(1956).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 21.
246. E.g., Kazuo Mori & Miho Arai, No Need to Fake It: Reproduction of the Asch
Experiment Without Confederates, 45 INT’L J. PSYCH. 390, 390 (2010).
247. E.g., Daniel J. Mallinson & Peter K. Hatemi, The Effects of Information and
Social Conformity on Opinion Change, PLOS ONE 1 (May 2, 2018), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0196600 [https://perma.cc/
Z7VG-BNGJ].
248. Gwen M. Wittenbaum, The Bias Toward Discussing Shared Information: Why
Are High-Status Group Members Immune?, 27 COMMC’N RSCH. 379, 393 (2000) (highlighting how decision-making groups “fail to disseminate effectively their unshared
information”).
249. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175,
179 (2002).
250. Id. at 176.
251. See, e.g., Michael X. Delli Carpini, Fay Lomax Cook & Lawrence R. Jacobs,
Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of
the Empirical Literature, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 315, 324 (2004) (“Like other forms of
participation, engagement in political talk—especially the more ‘costly’ forms, such as
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If individual jurors are biased because of pretrial publicity that misleadingly implicates the defendant, or even because of the defendant’s unappealing physical appearance, juries are likely to amplify
rather than correct those biases. Groups have been found to . . . be
more affected by the biasing effect of spurious arguments from lawyers; to be more susceptible to the “sunk cost fallacy”; and to be
more subject to choice-rank preference reversals.252

Simply putting people together for a discussion is, thus, no panacea
for cognitive failures.
To be fair, some research does find that deliberation is useful. For
example, Jessica Salerno and Michael McCauley exposed fifty-five undergraduate mock-trial participants to testimony given by both low
and high-quality experts.253 They found that the individual mock jurors were more discerning of quality after rather than before
deliberating.254
In theory, deliberation could enhance factfinding by allowing fellow
jurors to fill in gaps in colleagues’ memories.255 But we have already
suggested that reliance on sheer memory should become obsolete especially if we implement much shorter trial presentations and utilize
rewindable video presentations. Moreover, even if deliberation could
fill in gaps in jurors’ memories, scholars have unfortunately found that
the jurors who verbally dominate deliberations do not necessarily
have the most accurate memories.256 In fact, those who change their
recollections are not typically the least accurate ones but the least confident ones. As W.B. Yeats once wrote, “[t]he best lack all conviction[,] while the worst are full of passionate intensity.”257 This finding
parallels the famous Dunning-Kruger effect, which generally proposes
that confidence and knowledge are inversely correlated.258
deliberative meetings—appears to be linked to socioeconomic status and education . . . .”); Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating
Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 12 (2006) (presenting
experiments with “results which indicate that deliberation, even when attempted
under ideal conditions, does not improve social welfare, and, in all but rare circumstances, may decrease it”).
252. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s
Challenge to Habermas), 3 EPISTEME 192, 198 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
253. Jessica M. Salerno & Michelle R. McCauley, Mock Jurors’ Judgments About
Opposing Scientific Experts: Do Cross-Examination, Deliberation and Need for Cognition Matter?, 27 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 37, 37 (2009).
254. Id.
255. Mary E. Pritchard & Janice M. Keenan, Does Jury Deliberation Really Improve Jurors’ Memories?, 16 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSCH. 589, 589 (2002).
256. Id. at 591.
257. Scott Simon, Opinion: Reading William Butler Yeats 100 Years Later, NPR
(Nov. 28, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/11/28/939561949/opinion-readingwilliam-butler-yeats-100-years-later [https://perma.cc/2TQ5-RSUM].
258. See Gordon Pennycook et al., Dunning–Kruger Effects in Reasoning: Theoretical Implications of the Failure to Recognize Incompetence, 24 PYSCHONOMIC BULL. &
REV. 1774, 1774 (2017) (“The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that
the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence.”).
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As for why those with more accurate views tend not to lead deliberations, Lynn M. Sanders observes that “[w]hen Americans assemble in
juries, they do not leave behind the status, power, and privileges that
they hold in the outside world.”259 Thus, deliberation can squelch the
viewpoints of women, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups. Indeed, white men with college degrees are disproportionately made
forepersons,260 and when women speak, their words are perceived differently than identical words articulated by men.261 The fact that such
issues would not have bothered the Framers, who after all systematically excluded women and African Americans from jury service, is yet
further evidence of the incongruity of using an unchanged institution
from 1789 to resolve disputes in 2021.
An additional risk of deliberation involves the possibility that outspoken jurors will share personal anecdotes and purported expertise,
which then infects the views of fellow jurors. For example, in research
on mock jurors deliberating on a case involving lower-back pain, individual jurors habitually cited purported knowledge, either personal or
through acquaintances, of ideal clinical practice.262 As Paul Kirgis argued, “Specialized knowledge poses the same risks to the truth-seeking objectives of trial whether it enters the decision-making process
through expert testimony or through the back door of juror background knowledge.”263 When it comes in the front door, we have evidentiary rules and procedures so that unreliable testimony can be
excluded from the evidentiary record at trial or at least cross-examined.264 When it comes to the same sorts of comments in the jury
room, we just cross our fingers.
Aside from introducing extraneous factual claims, fellow jurors may
also use rhetoric, repetition, racism, and outright demagoguery that
would not be permitted of a trial witness or attorney in closing argu259. Lynn M. Sanders, Against Deliberation, 25 POL. THEORY 347, 364 (1997).
260. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 101 (1986).
261. Jessica Salerno & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, One Angry Woman: Anger Expression Increases Influence for Men, but Decreases Influence for Women, During Group
Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 581, 581 (2015).
262. Megan S. Wright, Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, Mock Juror
and Jury Assessment of Blinded Expert Witnesses, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO
BIAS 195, 202–04 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, eds., 2016); see
also Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no reversible
error existed where “the jury foreman, referring to her experience as a medical doctor, opined that [defendant’s] mental disorders caused him to commit his crime”).
263. Paul F. Kirgis, The Problem of the Expert Juror, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 493, 496
(2002); see also Kristin A. Liska, Note, Experts in the Jury Room: When Personal
Experience Is Extraneous Information, 69 STAN. L. REV. 911, 911 (2017) (“By virtue
of their own personal expertise, [expert jurors] pose a distinct risk of bringing in the
sort of information other jurors are prohibited from seeking out by simply using personal experience to analyze the evidence and theories at trial.”).
264. See FED. R. EVID. 606(a) (“A juror may not testify as a witness before the
other jurors at the trial.”); FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (requiring that expert witnesses be
qualified by virtue of their “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”).
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ments.265 It seems rather odd that the trial judge works so hard to
ensure that jurors are not exposed to such inadmissible material during the actual trial, but—as between jurors after trial—anything goes!
And per the procedural rules, the deliberations themselves are
shrouded in secrecy, thus making it nearly impossible for litigants to
challenge irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial interventions by
jurors.266
Although one might counter that deliberation will cause jurors to
mitigate biases and stereotypes, the literature is at best mixed. Deliberation may generally mitigate pre-existing stereotypes; however, if
the stereotype is activated during trial, deliberating magnifies its
effects.267
We suggest that rather than deliberate as a group, jurors simply
vote—a pragmatic solution, especially if juries become larger. After
all, the function of attorneys’ closing argument is to share divergent
viewpoints and highlight salient evidence. With the benefit of this robust adversarial process, it is not clear how the jurors’ own comments
help fellow jurors make up their minds.
Of course, one might understandably worry that deliberation yields
incidental benefits such as increasing a sense of political efficacy and
democratic engagement.268 On the other hand, scholars have concluded that “real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively,
can exacerbate rather than diminish power differentials . . . , can make
people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, [can
be] ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than
would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place.”269
265. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403 (prohibiting irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial evidence); see also Zapata v. Vasquez, 788 F.3d 1106, 1110–11, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015)
(granting relief after a prosecutor’s inflammatory, ethnically charged comments).
266. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987) (applying a common law
precursor to FED. R. EVID. 606, which prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except
in cases of “extraneous influence” from outside the jury itself, such as a bribe offered
to a juror); Peña–Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 859 (2017) (finding that the
Sixth Amendment permits inquiry where a juror discloses statements exhibiting overt
racial bias casting serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict). See generally Diane E. Courselle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (2005)
(discussing events that “allowed a peek into the jury deliberation room”).
267. Tamara M. Haegerich, Jessica M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Are the Effects
of Juvenile Offender Stereotypes Maximized or Minimized by Jury Deliberation?, 19
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 81, 81 (2013) (discussing findings of mock jury studies).
268. See Michael E. Morrell, Deliberation, Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy, 27 POL. BEHAV. 49, 49 (2005) (“[D]eliberation will not necessarily lead to direct, positive effects on citizens’ internal political efficacy, but they also
highlight the likelihood that face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel more
competent in their deliberative abilities.”).
269. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:
AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 191 (2004).
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We have suggested that deliberation is often actually deleterious,
even aside from the impracticality of having dozens or hundreds of
jurors deliberating together, in connection with our proposal for dramatically larger juries. Nonetheless, there are other less profound reforms that could facilitate larger juries while preserving some forms of
deliberation. For example, one potential alternative would involve using breakout groups or parallel juries wherein several groups of, perhaps, twelve jurors deliberate together, and then the juries’ votes
(rather than the jurors’ votes) are aggregated to reach a verdict.270
Various methods of reduced-form deliberation are also possible. For
example, each juror could submit comments, perhaps responding to
various prompts, and those responses could then be circulated to all
jurors or to a random selection of other jurors, who could then tag
them or vote on them to promote or demote them, not unlike how
some social-media platforms work. In this vein, recent scholarly work
has shown how carefully constructed interventions can help crowds
sort truth from falsehood.271
In short, even if deliberation were ideal, requiring that people be
physically present while deliberating is not technologically necessary.
And, from the social-scientific perspective of 2021, these secretive anything-goes conversations seem far from ideal.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY & LEGAL REFORMS
This Part reviews the constitutionality and legality of our proposed
reforms. Our assessment analyzes the Constitution’s commitment to
public trials, the Sixth and Seventh Amendments’ jury-trial guarantees, and, for criminal cases, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause and Vicinage Clause. After concluding that our reforms are
potentially constitutional, we analyze the permissibility of videoconferencing under the current Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure to examine the procedural innovations necessary to actualize
the widescale use of online juries.
270. See Campbell et al., supra note 160, at 557 (using such a method for research
purposes); see also Saks & Blanck, supra note 125, at 819–26 (discussing Cimino v.
Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), which used two juries in a
mass-tort context); Byron G. Stier, Jackpot Justice: Verdict Variability and the Mass
Tort Class Action, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2007) (arguing for the use of “multiple juries in individual cases”).
271. E.g., Gordon Pennycook & David G. Rand, Fighting Misinformation on Social
Media Using Crowdsourced Judgments of News Source Quality, 116 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. U.S. AM. 2521, 2521 (2019) (“[H]aving algorithms up-rank content from
trusted media outlets may be a promising approach for fighting the spread of misinformation on social media.”); Gordon Pennycook et al., Fighting COVID-19 Misinformation on Social Media: Experimental Evidence for a Scalable Accuracy-Nudge
Intervention, 31 PSYCH. SCI. 770, 770 (2020) (suggesting that “nudging people to think
about accuracy is a simple way to improve choices about what to share on social
media”).
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A. The Sixth and Seventh Amendments
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury for
most civil cases.272 The substance of the Amendment has never been
incorporated, but most states comply with the jury trial requirement
anyway.273 Although not applicable to all cases and waivable by the
parties, the right “is preserved to the parties inviolate.”274 Similarly,
the Sixth Amendment contains the jury right along with the most fundamental rights that American criminal defendants enjoy.275
To be sure, nothing in these Amendments or anywhere else in the
Constitution explicitly forbids having more jurors, requires secretive
interpersonal deliberation of jurors, or bars any of our other proposed
reforms.276 Even some of the most longstanding practices, like peremptory challenges, find no basis in the Constitution.277 As commentators have recently acknowledged, a question like “whether jury
trials must be in person [versus online] ostensibly falls in what
originalists [call] the ‘construction zone’—where legal practitioners
are afforded greater (albeit not unlimited) latitude in adjusting constitutional rights.”278 Perhaps some technological changes were unforeseeable, but if the Framers wanted to prevent a jury of 300 citizens
from convening, or if they wanted to explicitly require secretive deliberations, they could have said so. To be sure, mere silence on a tech272. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
273. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640 n.2 (1972) (“In the great majority of state
jurisdictions that have a state constitutional right to jury trial in state court proceedings, the test is similar to that employed by the federal courts in interpreting the
[S]eventh [A]mendment . . . .”).
274. Justin Sarno & Jayme Long, Social Distancing and Right to Jury Trial Must Be
Reconciled, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2020, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1261476/social-distancing-and-right-to-jury-trial-must-be-reconciled [https://perma.cc/
U9ZW-P7DJ] (emphasis added and citation omitted).
275. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
276. The Supreme Court has held that as little as six jurors can constitute a jury in
civil cases. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159–60 (1973) (noting that the Court
“express[ed] no view as to whether any number less than six would . . . satisf[y] the
Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases”); cf. Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223 (1978) (holding that defendant’s “trial on criminal charges before a fivemember jury deprived him of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments”). It has not suggested a maximum limit. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P.
48 (“A jury must begin with at least [six] and no more than [twelve] members . . . .”).
277. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (“This Court repeatedly has
stated that the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether without
impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.”). See generally Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810 (1997) (“[T]he benefits of the peremptory challenge system are outweighed by the damage which that system causes to
the most basic principles of an impartial jury.”).
278. Justin D. Rattey, Gap Filling: Assessing the Constitutionality of Virtual Criminal Trials in Light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 125 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 1, 3
(2020).
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nological or procedural innovation should not be read as a
proscription against it.279
The Supreme Court has written that “[w]hile ‘the intent of the
Framers’ is often an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history
casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption . . . that if a given
feature existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily preserved in the Constitution.”280 Indeed, the Founders themselves criticized traditionalists like Edmund Burke for preferring past
practice to pragmatic reform.281 In this vein, Cass Sunstein highlights
Madison’s preference for “reflection and choice” over “accident and
force.”282 As Jefferson wrote, because of time’s passing, “current generations have more experience than past generations.”283
It is, therefore, useful to utilize a functional and purposive analysis
that determines what goals the Founders sought to achieve with the
jury as an institution and, consequently, which reforms could help further these goals.284 As we wrote in the Introduction, those objectives
include democratic engagement and the accurate sorting of truth from
falsity. The foregoing sections demonstrate how those purposes can be
better achieved using contemporary science and technology.
Describing the function of the jury, the Supreme Court wrote that
its “purpose is [in large part] attained by the participation of the community in determinations of guilt and by the application of the common sense of laymen who, as jurors, consider the case.”285 We also
note the goals of the first Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to promote the “just, speedy, and efficient” resolution of trials286—and the
second Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure—“to provide for the just
determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifi279. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 n.16 (1974) (“The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the Constitution for a Presidential privilege
as to the President’s communications corresponding to the privilege of Members of
Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause. But the silence of the Constitution on
this score is not dispositive.” (emphasis added)).
280. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 (1970) (emphasis added).
281. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 398–99 (2006).
282. Id. at 398.
283. Id.
284. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV 1189, 1200 (1987) (describing an approach to constitutional interpretation analyzing the relevant “values, purposes, or political theory in
light of which the Constitution or certain elements of its language and structure are
most intelligible”).
285. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978) (citing Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 100 (1970)).
286. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts . . . [and] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” (emphasis added)).
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able expense and delay.”287 Ultimately, “[d]ue process, as [the Supreme] Court often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the
particular situation.”288
Lacking direct Supreme Court holdings on the questions we raise,
we consider how the Supreme Court has adapted to technological
change in relation to other constitutional rights such as those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In 2001, Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court in Kyllo v. United States, concluded that the police’s use of thermal-imaging technology to peek through a home’s walls was a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment even though the police using
the technology did not physically enter a home.289 The Court reiterated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of
what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well
as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”290 But the ultimate
intuition was more functionalist considering what and where the technology allowed the government to see (inside homes). Thus, like a
governmental intrusion into a home, the majority found that using
such technology was a search and presumptively unreasonable absent
a warrant.291 We suggest a similar functionalist approach for applying
technologies to juries.
In other contexts, courts apply balancing tests. For example, in pretrial discovery, courts weigh whether “good cause” exists for video
depositions.292 Some scholars, in the first weeks of the pandemic,
guessed that a similar approach would apply for online jury trials.293
Their predictions proved accurate.294 Moving our analysis beyond the
pandemic context requires a more nuanced analysis, but the functionalist caselaw provides some guidance.
287. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
288. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
289. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2001).
290. Id. at 40 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)) (emphasis
added).
291. Id. at 40. See also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018)
(police use of a new technology enabling mass acquisition of cell-site records constituted a “search”); id. at 2261 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (grants you the right to
invoke its guarantees whenever one of your protected things (your person, your
house, your papers, or your effects) is unreasonably searched or seized.”); see also
Bernard Chao, Catherine Durso, Ian Farrell & Christopher Robertson, Why Courts
Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 263
(2018) (discussing how “the police now exploit the ‘third party’ doctrine to access data
held by email and cell phone providers, without securing a warrant, on the Supreme
Court’s intuition that the public has no expectation of privacy in that information”).
292. See JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, III, EDISCOVERY AND DIGITAL
EVIDENCE § 18:13 (2020).
293. Michael Pressman & Michael Shammas, Memorandum: The Permissibility &
Constitutionality of Jury Trial by Videoconference, CIV. JURY PROJECT (May 4, 2020),
https://civiljuryproject.law.nyu.edu/memorandum-the-permissibility-constitutionalityof-jury-trial-by-videoconference/ [https://perma.cc/38WE-T7TF].
294. See Boutros et al., supra note 47, at 53.

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL106.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 49

THE JURY TRIAL REINVENTED

15-NOV-21

13:19

157

Beyond a general functionalism about the goals of accuracy and
democratic representation, the Constitution provides a few additional
lodestars. In what follows, we consider the effect of our reforms on
the ideal of public trials and then consider the constitutionality of our
reforms under the Constitution’s requirements involving impartiality,
confrontation, and vicinage, respectively.
B. Public Justice
American justice is public justice.295 As the Supreme Court has
written, public criminal trials are “essential” because “the presence of
interested spectators . . . keep [a defendant’s] triers keenly alive to a
sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.”296 Courts have since clarified that civil trials should generally
be just as public as criminal ones. The California Supreme Court’s
rationale is representative: “[T]he public has an interest, in all civil
cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial
system.”297
Public trials are also valuable for a less obvious reason. Like an
Athenian agora, jury service provides an opportunity to cooperatively
evaluate crucial societal issues and to do so in a manner that is increasingly less common in our age where so much debate occurs on
either partisan media or in social-media bubbles. John Stuart Mill mirrored this point in Considerations on Representative Government,
where he praised the petit jury’s institutional ability to prepare citizens to live and participate within democracies by teaching them to
evaluate and therefore respect norms.298
On this front, little conflict exists between online justice and public
justice; increasing use of the former may serve the latter. Indeed, an
online pandemic-era trial attracted about 2,000 viewers, many more
than could fit into a live courtroom.299 Oddly, while permitting audio
broadcasts, some courts—especially before the coronavirus—resisted
video broadcasts of trials and hearings, as if that were too public.300
In addition to streaming public hearings online, during the
COVID–19 pandemic several states decided to make hearings available for citizens who lack internet access by setting up viewing rooms in
295. See Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and
Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2011).
296. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
270 n.25 (1948)).
297. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC–TV), Inc. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 980 P.2d 337,
360 (1999) (emphasis in original).
298. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
78–79 (1862).
299. Siegal, supra note 67.
300. See Mary Flood, Windows Opening and Doors Closing—How the Internet Is
Changing Courtrooms and Media Coverage of Criminal Trials, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV.
429, 431 (2009).
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courthouses with spaced seating.301 After the coronavirus pandemic
ends, public libraries, local and state legislatures, and other communal
buildings could continue coordinating with courts to ensure that every
citizen, jurors and interested spectators alike, can watch online trials.
Synchronicity is presently a real limitation to the publicity of trials—people can only be in one place at a time. Especially if courts
post asynchronous trial videos online, the internet will vastly increase
the number of people able to watch trials at their own convenience.
The well-documented decline in the percentage of trials may render
the right to a public trial even more important today than it was in
Mill’s time.302 Several of our reforms (such as condensing trial
presentations) are designed to make trials less expensive and cumbersome, and others (like larger juries) are designed to make them less
risky and unreliable. These advantages may well serve the goals of
public justice by facilitating more trials.
C. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”303 Some scholars believe that the Confrontation Clause prevents criminal trials, bench or jury, from being held
entirely online unless a defendant consents.304 But the exact meaning
of “confrontation” remains an open question. In addition, even if
“confrontation” does require defendants to be in the same room as
their accusers, it is difficult to see why it would also require that jurors
be physically present.
We have yet to receive a firm answer from the Supreme Court on
whether online trials violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause.305 Given the rate of technological advancement, it seems
likely the Court will eventually uphold the practice—at least in live
trials conducted with secure videoconferencing software.306 Several
301. See, e.g., Jamiles Lartey, The Judge Will See You on Zoom, but the Public is
Mostly Left Out, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 13, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoom-but-the-public-is-mostly-left-out [https://perma.cc/RE47-VXJ8].
302. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial
World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2177 (2014).
303. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
304. Draper, supra note 86, at I.-3.
305. See id. at I.-7.
306. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 48, at 37 (“In 2013, I predicted that judges and
lawyers would initially resist the idea of remote video hearings but would nevertheless
relent because of the impressive nature of high-definition video displays. I also predicted that the Supreme Court would find the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause satisfied by remote witness appearances, but maybe not within my
lifetime.” (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted)).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\9-1\TWL106.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 51

THE JURY TRIAL REINVENTED

15-NOV-21

13:19

159

cases address rights provided by the Confrontation Clause.307 A subcategory of such cases—involving witness testimony against the accused via closed-circuit television—are useful in discerning how courts
would treat confrontation issues in online criminal jury trials.308
In Maryland v. Craig, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
does not categorically forbid child abuse victims from testifying
against defendants via one-way closed-circuit television.309 In deciding
the key issue—whether the physical presence of the defendant before
his accuser was necessary—Justice O’Connor wrote that “the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit [the] use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-face confrontation, ensures the reliability
of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous adversarial testing and
thereby preserves the essence of effective confrontation.”310 When a
sufficient state interest justifies virtual instead of physical confrontation, the Court implied that three conditions must exist to make oneway testimony constitutionally permissible: First, witnesses must testify under oath; second, they must be subject to “full cross-examination”; and third, they must be visible to “the judge, jury, and
defendant” when testifying.311 If one-way video using pre-1990s technology is constitutional given a sufficient state interest, then two-way
video using today’s technology may very well meet constitutional muster.312 For this reason, several scholars have recently rallied around
the idea of using two-way video to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.313
307. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (“[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to
its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom
at every stage of his trial.”).
308. E.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. (“Because there is no dispute that the child witnesses in this case testified
under oath, were subject to full cross-examination, and were able to be observed by the
judge, jury, and defendant as they testified, we conclude that, to the extent that a
proper finding of necessity has been made, the admission of such testimony would be
consonant with the Confrontation Clause.” (emphasis added)).
312. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999) (deciding not to
apply the Craig standard because the trial court’s use of two-way video “preserved the
face-to-face confrontation”).
313. E.g., J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Comment, Confronting Confrontation in a FaceTime Generation: A Substantial Public Policy Standard to Determine the Constitutionality of Two-Way Live Video Testimony in Criminal Trials, 75 LA. L. REV. 175, 177
(2014); see also Will Resnik, Comment, Get with the Times: Why the Use of Live TwoWay Video Testimony Does Not Violate the Confrontation Clause, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L.
461, 464, 480 (2019) (“[T]he use of two-way video testimony does not violate the
Confrontation Clause.”); Hadley Perry, Comment, Virtually Face-to-Face: The Confrontation Clause and the Use of Two-Way Video Testimony, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U.
L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2008) (“[L]ive two-way video testimony is constitutional” because “its use is consistent with the . . . common law right of confrontation,” its use is
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State analogues to the federal Confrontation Clause vary. Some
state constitutions have been interpreted to categorically bar testimony via videoconferencing in criminal jury trials.314 Massachusetts,
for example, requires “face-to-face” confrontation.315 But others allow digital testimony.316 For example, in People v. Wrotten, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled in 2009 that—absent a statutory proscription—trial courts are free to order two-way video testimony
when circumstances (there, an ill witness) require it.317 More importantly, the court used logic that could apply even absent exigent circumstances, writing that, “live two-way video may preserve the
essential safeguards of testimonial reliability, and so satisfy the Confrontation Clause’s primary concern with ensuring the reliability of
the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous
testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact.”318
Of course, if given the choice between a traditional trial versus one
fully embracing our six reforms, innocent risk-averse defendants may
well prefer the latter. Nonetheless, the logic in cases like Wrotten
should expand to allow for video-based confrontation even absent exigent circumstances and even without the consent of defendants. Eventually, the state’s own interests in accurate outcomes, democratic
representation on juries, and efficiency of trial processes may override
contrary objections.
D. The Implications for Procedural Rules
If our reforms in Part II are adopted, key goals of both criminal and
civil juries might be strengthened. These are articulated in the first
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—to promote the “just, speedy, and
efficient” resolution of trials319—and the second Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure—“to provide for the just determination of every
criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in
administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.”320
Here, we briefly analyze how, if large-scale online jury trials become a
“more protective of defendants’ interests,” and its use is “cost-efficient and
convenient.”).
314. Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Mass. 1988); see also People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ill. 1994) (interpreting the Illinois Constitution’s confrontation clause).
315. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d at 371; accord Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 687 (“[A] defendant is entitled to a face-to-face confrontation with a witness.”).
316. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 315 P.3d 136, 152 (Colo. App. 2012) (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855–57 (1990), and holding that neither the Colorado nor
federal Constitution render CCTV testimony unconstitutional).
317. People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (N.Y. 2009).
318. Id. at 1102 (alterations incorporated) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
319. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
320. FED. R. CRIM. P. 2.
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reality, state and federal procedures must change. We use the two sets
of federal rules as jumping-off points.
Several changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could
make clear that online proceedings are permissible. For instance, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1—detailing definitions and scope—
defines “telephone” as “any technology for transmitting live electronic voice communication” but has no provisions for simultaneous
video for situations when more than audio is required.321 Other terms
like “place of prosecution and trial” could be revised,322 and the Rules
ubiquitously refer to proceedings “before” judicial officers and could
clarify if “before” implies a physical presence.323
A second useful change involves adapting existing provisions for
video evidence to jury trials. For example, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5(f), concerning initial appearances, stipulates that “video
teleconferencing may be used to conduct an appearance . . . if the
defendant consents.”324 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 10 likewise allows for videoconferencing during arraignments if consent is
given.325 Interestingly, the 2002 Committee Notes permitting videoconferencing noted as follows:
The Committee was satisfied that the technology has progressed to
the point that video teleconferencing can address the concerns
raised in the past about the ability of the court and the defendant to
see each other and for the defendant and counsel to be in contact
with each other, either at the same location or by a secure remote
connection.326

This recognition, in turn, supports the notion that online trials can satisfy not only the Confrontation Clause but also the right to effective
counsel so long as reliability concerns articulated in cases like Craig
are addressed. Twenty years later, the Committee Notes could again
be updated to reflect improvements made possible since then.
Another change might involve creating an entirely new rule detailing how online jury trials should be conducted, not unlike the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure’s stipulations regarding best-practices for
out-of-court witness testimony discussed below.327 The rule drafters
might benefit from examining several of the coronavirus-era protocols
mentioned earlier.328
Beyond the procedural rules, Congress could revisit the Sixth
Amendment’s Vicinage Clause, which requires that a trial be in the
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

See id. at 1.
Id. at 18.
E.g., id. at 1.
Id. at 5(g).
Id. at 10(c).
Id.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
See generally supra Part I.
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“State and district wherein the crime [was] committed.”329 Congress
could provide for statewide districts, which would thereby increase the
geographic scope and diversity of juries, reducing biases of localism.330
Importantly, at least three federal circuits have held that the Clause
does not apply to the states, clearing the way for statewide juries in
state cases as well.331
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state analogues would not
require changes as far-reaching as those required for criminal procedure rules. Most would merely modify definitions. Currently, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) provides that “[f]or good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may
permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission
from a different location,” and the 1996 Advisory Committee noted
that video is generally the preferrable means of transmission.332 An
advisory committee could now go further to explicate the “appropriate safeguards” for video testimony for not only witnesses but also
attorneys and jurors. The same issues—involving concerns like economic and temporal efficiency, pragmatism, and the ease of credibility
determinations—arise. For example, “the relative cost of transporting” witnesses to court, as well as the ability of the court to subpoena
witnesses—both factors in Rule 43(a)—could analogously be used to
suggest best practices for online juries, especially in evaluating courts’
abilities to empanel a representative jury.333
Rule 43(a) exemplifies the experience judges already have with
videoconferencing in civil matters. Some state rules already mirror
43(a): Maine requires that testimony typically be in “open court”
while allowing “contemporaneous transmission from a different location” upon a demonstration of “good cause.”334 Accordingly, state
policymakers could also use Rule 43(a) as a guide.335
329. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
330. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96 (1970) (“Congress [has] the power to determine the actual size of the ‘vicinage’ by its creation of judicial districts.”).
331. Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345 (6th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1980).
332. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (describing when testimony need not be taken in “open
court” and can instead be taken by video); see also United States v. Guild, No.
1:07cr404, 2008 WL 191184, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2008) (applying the rule to a
criminal case where confrontation was not an issue).
333. See Daniel Devoe & Sarita Frattaroli, Videoconferencing in the Courtroom:
Benefits, Concerns, and How to Move Forward, MASS. SOC. L. LIBR. 8–9, http://
socialaw.com/docs/default-source/judge-william-g.-young/judging-in-the-american-legal-system/04devoe-sarita-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ79-XHAU]. Though it focuses on courts ability to use their subpoena power over proposed witnesses, in the
context of an online jury trial, a similar test—the ability of the court to bring jurors to
court—seems pertinent. Id.
334. ME. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (emphasis added).
335. Cf. Guild, 2008 WL 191184, at *3 (“Recognizing both the importance of live
testimony in a criminal trial and the fact that the Confrontation Clause is not impli-
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Ultimately, notwithstanding the need to reconsider procedural
rules, adopting our reforms should generally lessen complexity. For
example, several of the most debated procedural rules that our proposals implicate—venue rules, for instance336—may become less convoluted because our national jury-pool reform reduces forumshopping incentives.
V. CONCLUSION
The Founders would not recognize how we build bridges, treat cancer, or transport ourselves. Yet the modern jury trial would be oddly
familiar. Such stagnation would disappoint them. As James Madison
remarked, “Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst
[Americans] have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times
and other nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to over-rule . . . experience?”337
We have suggested that, if invented today—after the peculiar experience of COVID–19 and with 232 years of scientific, political, and
social experience—the jury trial would look quite different. Since the
institution is supposed to accomplish its essential functions of facilitating democratic deliberation and accurately resolving issues of public
importance, it should look quite different.338 Under a new model, we
might convene fifty or more jurors; utilize condensed videos to integrate evidence, arguments, and jury instructions; and even allow jurors to render individual, mathematically aggregated decisions
privately in a time and place of their choosing.
Although some of the reforms seem radical, this is only because of
how radically static the jury as an institution has remained despite
post-1789 scientific and social developments. Our reforms are no
more radical than overused alternatives to physical jury trials like
mandatory arbitration, and are likely both more constitutional and
more faithful to the jury’s animating values. Online jury trials are
surely less offensive to the Seventh Amendment than the increasing
use of contracts of adhesion that incorporate a combination of classaction waivers and arbitration agreements to effectively nullify the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial.339
cated by this testimony, the Court will use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) as
the threshold showing for the use of video testimony . . . .”).
336. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2011).
337. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 72 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
338. See supra Part I.
339. Courts have, in especially egregious cases, struck down arbitration clauses.
See, e.g., Sevier Cnty. Schs. Fed. Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 990 F.3d
470, 476–79 (6th Cir. 2021) (listing cases striking down arbitration clauses in egregious
situations). Nonetheless, unless bad faith exists or a change-of-terms provision’s scope
is unreasonably exceeded, courts rarely find mandatory arbitration agreements to be
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And of course, these reforms need not be implemented all at once.
In the shorter term, we might opt for less extreme reforms—conducting more online jury trials to enable larger jury pools or aggregating the decisions of several parallel juries instead of several individual
jurors, thereby preserving deliberation while retaining the benefits of
scale.
Ultimately, our reforms enhance the jury trial’s ability to achieve its
essential goals: giving the people—not elites—the power to accurately
decide cases and determine societal norms.340
unconscionable, especially since the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011).
340. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *378.

